Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/16

 2 THE EDITOR : stages of the sequence must persist in later stages with a difference only in vividness and in time position. Save only in these respects, there is a sameness in point of kind between the presentations as they originally occur and as they are retained in memory. What gives the keenest interest to this statement is that it occurs in connexion with the most fundamental point of Mr. Hodgson's theory of the differen- tiation of Subject and Object. This theory seems to me to be the most noteworthy that has been as yet advanced to show how the distinction of Subject and Object may be supposed to arise out of the distinctionless unity of a more primitive experience. But I shall not in this address discuss it, except in so far as it may be bound up with the special problem of time perception, which we are immediately concerned with. If Mr. Hodgson's own answer to the question should turn out to be untenable, his general theory of the subject-object relation may be still defensible. But in any case, it will require restatement in a modified form. This connexion with a fundamental metaphysical problem may serve to give the theme which I have chosen something of that comprehensive interest which ought to attach to the topic of a Presidential Address. The problem before us has been much agitated of late in Germany. It will be convenient for us to begin by some account of the opposing views advocated by two of the most distinguished writers who have contributed to the discussion Schumann and Meinong. Schumann is well known for his experimental investigation of the perception of small in- tervals of time, and Meinong is among the most penetrating, careful, and conscientious of analytic psychologists. Schumann, in an article on the " Psychology of Time-per- ception," l criticises very sharply the view that, in order to apprehend cither time-sequence or relations of intensity or quality between successive sensation, we must necessarily re- tain in consciousness a group of memory images. He dis- cusses first the case of comparison in respect of intensity or quality. Suppose that we are comparing two sounds heard in succession, with a view to determining which is the louder. First one sound is heard, and then, after an interval of two or three seconds, the other; and on this follows the judgment, louder, less loud, or equally loud. This judgment is dependent only on the relative not on the absolute intensity of the sounds. It is determined by the conjoint operation of both of them, not by either, apart from the other. But though Bd. xvii., p. 106.