Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/145

 X. PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. viii., No. 3. Frontispiece, ' The New Kant Portrait.' J. CK Schurman. ' Kant's a priori Elements of Understanding.' [Exposition and criticism of the Transcendental Analytic, on the assumption that the (previously criticised) .(Esthetic ina be taken for granted. The problem of the pure science of nature. The emergence of categories, according as objects of perception are thought in the various forms of logical combination. The under- standing as conferring objectivity on the phenomena of sense ; the transcendental deduction. Synthesis in knowledge, and the objective unity of apperception. Time as mediator between category and phenomenon. Examination of the 'analogies of experience'.] X. O. 'Winslow. ' A Defence of Realism.' [Critique of Royce's Conception of God. The idealistic argument that we can know nothing ' beyond ' con- sciousness is a paralogism ; the distinction should be between the self in thought and the not-self, beyond-self, in thought. The bridge from subjective to absolute idealism is an analogy only. Personality and the reality of fellow-beings are left unexplained. Finally, God is given a merely quantitative definition. We must go back to Berkeley for a true realism.] H. Haldar. 'The Conception of the Absolute.' [Royce defines the Absolute as thought and experience, following Hegel. He further identifies will with attention, and attributes this only to the Absolute. But will involves conscious effort, and Royce's position ignores the ' energy ' of science. Also, the Absolute must feel perfect pleasure, and be conscious of time distinctions. On the other hand, Royce is better than Howison on the question of individuality. The Absolute is superpersonal.] E. Adickes. ' German Philosophy during the Years 1896-1898.' [History of Philosophy ; Metaphysics.] Discussion. E. B. Titchener. ' Structural and Functional Psychology.' [Reply to Caldwell. Introspection in descriptive psychology ; mind as function of the total organism ; the mental element as process ; psychology and energetics.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. Vol. viii., No. 4. J. GK Schurman. 'Kant's a priori Elements of the Understanding.' II. [Kant always remained a rationalist ; not in the Wolfiian sense, but a ' formal, epistemological, phenomenalistic ' rationalist. It was to save this rationalism that the whole Analytic was composed. Kant may be said to have ' discovered ' the function of the unity of apperception in the generation of the con- sciousness of objects ; he neglected the involuntary origination and con- nexion of the presentations of sense. The transcendental deduction, which should construct the fact that ' knowledge implies a unity of self- consciousness,' is to-day so much useless scaffolding. Understanding does not beget objectivity, whether in the ordinary meaning of thinghood or in the Kantian of necessary and universal validity.] J. C. Murray. ' Rousseau : His Position in the History of Philosophy.' [Suggested by the recent works of Davidson and Texte. Historical sketch of the doc-