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 126 NEW BOOKS. which Mr. Spencer was particularly interested, having become familiarised when still a youth with the practical working of the English Poor Law, both old and new. If he rejects Socialism it is from no indifference to the lot of the working classes, but because he sincerely believes that their position would be made worse by the substitution of collectivism for competition. And so far from feeling satisfaction with the actual state of society he was led by the passion for reform to work out the whole theory of evolution. For Prof. Vidari is quite mistaken in assuming that this theory arose from the spontaneous development of physical science, or that it was something that Mr. Spencer picked up by the way and fitted tant bien que mal to his utilitarian ethics. It was rather a sucker thrown out from the ethical theory which in turn became a support to the parent trunk. The theoretical criticism of Mr. Spencer's ethics is largely vitiated by an assumption for which the authorities who set the subject of competi- tion for the ' premio Bavizza ' are primarily responsible. In obedience to the terms employed by those gentlemen the epithet materialistic, although repeatedly disclaimed by Mr. Spencer, is throughout these pages applied to his teaching. Merely as a question of courtesy people should not be called by names to which they object unless grave reasons for so doing can be given. Nor is the question merely verbal. Misuse of words leads to misstatements about facts. Prof. Vidari represents Mr. Spencer as saying that ' Force is no other than the subjective correlative of Matter ' (p. 185) and this in complete forgetfulness of an earlier passage in his own exposition where the objectivity assigned to Force in First Principles is perfectly recognised (p. 164). Another time, and again in direct contradiction to his own exposition, he charges Mr. Spencer with denying any active efficacy to thought, feeling, and will. Finally when Mr. Spencer claims to have established in opposition to the empiricism of the older utilitarians a necessarily causal relation between certain courses of action and the production of pleasure and pain, this is in- terpreted to mean that morality results from a process of unconscious evolution ultimately dependent on the persistence of force. Prof. Vidari denies, on the authority of Wundt, that force persists, the law of the con- servation of energy being inapplicable to mental action (p. 210), and expatiates at length on the importance of consciousness in morality. He has of course a right to think what he likes about force ; but his criticisms are irrelevant. What Mr. Spencer says in this connexion about conduct and causation does not refer to the ultimate derivation 'of human activity from the forces of nature, but to the necessary effect of certain courses of action, consciously carried on, in increasing or diminishing the sum of human pleasures and pains. The whole discussion moves on the ground of conscious life ; and there is nothing essential to the method or the conclusions that a believer in free-will, as such, might not accept. For the rest Prof. Vidari disputes Mr. Spencer's positions at every point. He denies that pleasure is the final good ; that the felicific effect of actions can be calculated ; that the good are more adapted to the social environment than the bad ; that the survival of the fittest is conducive to morality ; that acquired moral habits are inherited ; that the feeling of obligation is destined to disappear in a perfect society. But as there is nothing original about his objections they cannot be noticed here. When the essayist attempts to be original he becomes confused. The errors of moral philosophers are due, he thinks, to their not sufficiently distinguishing between the science of morality and morality itself. According to his view instead of telling us what we ought to do they