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 TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY. 77 what conditions the superiority of one source of testimony to another depends. Sincerity and absence of bias may belong to any testimony, but to "authority" or authoritative testimony they must. The possession of these characters does not alone guarantee its trustworthiness ; but their absence or a doubt as to their presence does assure us of its twtrustworthiness. The re- maining characters (1) accuracy of memory and expression, (2) opportunities for knowing, and (3) capacity are therefore those on which the relative value or the grade of trustworthi- ness of testimony depends. For these may vary in degree without absolutely invalidating the testimony. Where, then, there is direct conflict, which of the two opposing statements is to be preferred must be decided by determining which of the assertors or groups of assertors- has been the more accurate in memory and expression, or has had the better opportunities or capacity for ascertaining the matter asserted. This account of the procedure to be adopted in cases of conflicting authority still, however, needs further amplification ; for there are three characters to con- sider, and the weight of these perchance in any given case may not be all on one side. It may happen for instance that great capacity is found coupled with small opportunity ; or ample opportunities with relatively smaller capacity. Granted the bare mini- mum of each of these characters without which the testi- mony would i'all into the great class of the unreliable can we fix the order of precedence, in respect of their authority, of the several combinations that may occur? An attempt, to do so soon discloses that ibeir order must vary with the nature of the subject-matter. Testimony may broadly be divided into (1) expressions of judgment or opinion, and (2) assertions of fact ; and the latter into (a) matters of common observation or patent facts, and (6) latent facts, the subject of experiment or research. It is clear that capacity plays a chief part in the trustworthiness of judgment and research, while in the case of patent facts the reliability is chiefly grounded on the assertor's means or opportunities for knowing. Further,, nothing beyond the bare minimum of accuracy in memory and exposition adds anything to the reliability in either case. In expressions of judgment or opinion, and in the descrip- tion of facts disclosed by research, it would seem, there- fore, that we ought to give preference to the authority of capacity, while in regard to patent facts we must conclude that authority is to be measured chiefly by opportunity.