Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/580

 566 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. points urged by S., it is maintained that strength of will is not the in- tensity of an actual state of consciousness, and also that aversion is not essentially distinct from desire, being only a desire for the non-existence of something.] E. Posch. ' Ausgangsspunkte zu einer Theorie der Zeitvorstellung.' [Duration is nothing but existence considered in re- ference to time. Two ways in which the conception of duration arises. Measurement is an essential constituent of this concept. What is really meant by the irreversibility of the Past. The spatial setting of our re- presentation of time relations. The discussion of this point is especially valuable.] Paul Barth. ' Fragen der Geschichtswissenshaft.' [Besides descriptive history, which can never be reduced to a scheme of causal uniformities, there must also be a conceptual treatment of history which aims at formulating such a scheme and finds its basis in the results of scientific psychology.] Besprechungen. ARCHIV FUE SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. Band v., Heft 3. B. Tschitscherin. ' Eaum und Zeit ' (Schluss). [An outline sketch of a system of ontology which we do not venture to reproduce in a brief abstract.] L. Goldschmidt. ' Kant's Voraussetzungen und Prof. Dr. Fr. Paulsen. [A sharp attack on Paulsen's exposition of Kant. It is maintained that Kant's main aim is to deny the possibility of meta- physical knowledge as contrasted with practical faith, and to show that the conditions which make knowledge possible in natural science are wanting in metaphysical speculation. Kant does not aim at justifying the validity of mathematical and natural science ; he assumes this validity.] Heinrich Griinbaum. 'Zur Kritik der Modernen Causal- anschauungen.' [Gives a systematic classification of various views of the causal relation by reference to three questions: (1) What is the essential characteristic of the relation expressed in the causal judgment ? (2) How far and in what sense are such judgments logically valid ? (3) What is the methodological value of the category of causation ? and what modifications does it require for scientific purposes ? Discussion of the views of Eiehl, Sigwart and Wundt.] H. Kleinpeter. ' Ueber den Begriff der Erfahrung. Ein Nachtrag.' J. Baumann. ' 1st Mach von mir missverstanden worden ? ' Zeitschriften, etc. PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Bd. xi., Heft 4. C. Gutberlet. 'Der Psychophysische Parallelismus.' [The writer does not deny the paral- lelism of mental and bodily acts, but he maintains that they proceed from the substantial union of the soul with the body, against other theories from that of Spinoza to that of Kiilpe. He discusses at length Jodl's views on the subject. The idea of mental and extra mental phenomena being two different aspects of the same reality is untenable ; for who is there to see those aspects and distinguish between them ? But Jodl goes farther and identifies them absolutely. If so, both matter, thought of apart from mind, and mind thought of apart from matter, would be mere abstractions, which is not the case.] N. Kaufmann. ' Die Methode des Mechanischen Monismus.' [The mechanical theory of Monism, though as old as Empedocles, claims to be the only possible means of reconciling religion with science, by means of a world-soul, or God, residing in each atom, and giving it force and movement. But it denies God's personality, and therefore amounts to Atheism ; also human freedom and the immortality of the soul, by an unproved and unprovable hypothesis. It is to this hypothesis, not to the laws of science, that religion is opposed. Note that there is a theistical theory of Monism which, admitting God's immanence, also affirms His tran- scendency : this would not come into conflict with religion.] N. v. See- land. 'Zur Frage son dem Wesen des Eaumes.' [The two theories of