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 548 NEW BOOKS. is for the biologist and psychologist ; but when " la conscience supe- rieure perd d'abord son devenir normal," so causing trophic and other troubles, it belongs to the psychologist alone to study "la cause premiere des psychopathies replies" (p. 81). This distinction, which is frequently referred to, seems to me illegitimate, unless the author means that, hitherto, the only physiological method subtle enough to match the subtlety of the psychical concurrences is, if I may say so> psychological. Taken literally, M. Duprat's distinction would contradict the fundamental assumption of the psycho-physical organism. In this part there is some valuable discussion on effort (p. 86), character and personality (p. 92). "En realite il n'y a que des maladies de la personnaliteV' From this we proceed to the pathology of the mental functions (a) intellectual instability, including distraction, delirium, dreams, hallucinations, illusions, anaesthesia, amnesia, troubles of judg- ment and reasoning; (6) instability in tendencies, including certain manias, impulsion, repulsion ; (c) emotional instability ; (d) instability in actions. M. Duprat combats the necessity for any hypothesis of " double personality". But his positions on this matter, though verbally in strong antagonism to the contentions of the " mental disaggregationists " or " dissociationists," are not, it seems to me, much different in substance. For example, his rejection of mental " vivisection " (as in suppression of states by hypnotic suggestion) gives the case away when it is admitted (p. 259) that, in certain psycho-pathic conditions, we do discover the " effets particuliers de 1'imagination, des instincts, des diverses tendances, des habitudes, quandrien ne les re/reneplus"th&t is when the (indispensable to the normal state) superior centre is, so to speak, out of office. Many such points arise for argument ; but space forbids. The last part part iii. focusses results for the ends of education. These chapters contain many useful practical principles. The fundamental distinction that, it seems to me, is not made in the book is the distinction between " unity of consciousness " as an epistemological assumpt and " union of conscious- nesses" as, to borrow from physics, the moving point in psychological kinematics. This brief note does nothing like justice to the amount of careful scholarship that the book contains. W. LESLIE MACKENZIE. Lettres Inedites de John Stuart Mill a Auguste Comte. Publiees avec les Beponses de Comte et une Introduction. Par L. LE"VY-BRUHL, Maitre de Conferences de philosophic & la Faculte des lettres de 1'Universite de Paris, Professeur & 1'Ecole libre des sciences politiques. Paris : Felix Alcan, 1899. Pp. xxxviii., 560. With the full approval of the representatives of both Comte and Mill, the whole correspondence between the two philosophers is now published. Comte's letters appeared separately in 1877. They are now reprinted from the original manuscripts. Mill's letters are printed from a copy, of which, however, there is no doubt about the accuracy. All the letters now appear in chronological order. The dates are from 8th November, 1841, to 17th May, 1847. A useful index of names and subjects is added. M. Lvy-Bruhl has prefixed to the correspondence an excellent and judicial summary. Mill, he points out, at first gave Comte the impres- sion that he was a disciple. Comte had besides been impressed by the fact that his work had drawn more attention in England than in France. From this he derived the mistaken idea that there was already a defin- itely " positivist " group in England. The correspondence as it proceeded destroyed both these illusions ; disclosing irreconcilable divergence*