Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/547

 J. P. DUBAND, Aperfus de Taxinomie Generate. 533 Lotze's remark l on " our habit of representing to ourselves the countless multitudes of mankind not merely as instances of their genus, but as parts of Humanity ; in the case of animals the peculiar ethical reasons which bring this about are wanting, and we are not in the habit of speaking in the same sense of ' Animal- ity ' ". The most faithful votary of formal Logic must be startled, I think, when he is told that Humanity, even as a nature or con- tent, is " present and entire in each of us ". The question arises whether we can have even our generic nature except as parts of a whole. The question of the reality and individuality of universals is underneath the entire discussion, and M. Durand has some shrewd remarks affecting it. Within the Order of Composition itself the Order of Eesemblance appears in various degrees, and as it fades the co-operation of parts strengthens. M. Durand notes this point, but does not observe how the substitution of Identity for Eesemblance would bear upon it. However, there is no doubt that a confusion is possible between the prima facie senses of generality as above distinguished, and M. Durand thinks that he has convicted both Littre and Bichat of errors in this sense. The third Order is the Order of Hierarchy the relation of rank between heads or centres of units, which are themselves related in order of Composition, as, in the Army, the Generalissimo to the Generals of Divisions. Passing from this, which seems to me unimportant, we come to the fourth type of series known as the Order of Genealogy and of Evolution, which depends on re- lations of kinship (Parente), under the three species of Ascent, Descent and Collaterality. Like the Order of Composition and the Order of Hierarchy, the Order of Genealogy deals throughout and exclusively with the actual objects to be classified " which occupy and constitute without exception the cadres of the table of classification". In this point, as we have seen, there is prima facie an absolute difference between these three orders and the Order of Generic Generality. The chapter on the Genealogical Order ends by stating the question whether a first ancestor in the Genealogical Order can also be the genus of his descendants con- sidered as species in the Generic Order. The provisional answer is that this may appear to be the case, but only through an equivo- cation by which the nature or content of the common ancestor is confused with his actual individuality. Passing over discussions of some interest we will now pursue this question as it is further treated in the chapter on Natural Classification. The problem of Natural Classification on the Evolutionist hypo- thesis is here treated as = the problem of combining a " Generic" with a " Genealogical " Classification. If the genealogical facts could be represented by a progressive linear series of the type of the chaine des etres, a generic classification could be applied to this by simply dividing the series into segments of the greatest 1 Hetaphysic, p. 179, Engl. transl.