Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/543

 CHRISTIAN v. EHRENFELS, System der Werttheorie. 529 imperatives of Paedagogy, of Therapeutics, of Bridge- building, and the like, depends on the presence of certain desires, and is quite absent in the case of those who do not wish to teach, to heal, or to build bridges. . . . Now the applicability of the im- peratives of practical Ethics depends in like manner on the presupposition of certain actual desires. . . ; but these desires differ from those implied in other practical disciplines in this respect, that they are in some degree present in every normally constituted and fully developed human being, though not always with the same completeness and force, and moreover that they are present not only as bearing on the individual's own conduct but also on that of all his fellow-men. In this last point the other practical disciplines present no real analogy, for no impartial spec- tator demands that another shall be a teacher, a doctor, or a bridge -builder ; but each one demands that every other shall fulfil the requirements of Ethics." In order, however, to see what the requirements of Ethics are, it is necessary to take account of all the conditions of human conduct, and no one investigator can have a complete survey of these. Hence the statesman, the poet, and others will often be able to contribute as much to the actual determination of the best modes of conduct as the theoretical student of Ethics, whose contributions to practical morality must in all cases be of a very modest character. In general the im- portant point for practical purposes is to understand the process of development as it is actually going on, and to cultivate that ' love of development ' to which reference has already been made as one of the most valuable moral dispositions (pp. 254-55). All that Ehrenfels says on this point seems admirable ; though it might perhaps have been made somewhat clearer if he had dis- tinguished between the purely normative aspect of Ethics (as defining a standard) and its more strictly practical aspect (as seeking to guide conduct). It must be apparent, even from this brief sketch, that the work of Ehrenfels is one of great interest and importance. And, indeed, the reader would probably find it much more interesting than such a sketch as this would suggest ; for the power of Ehrenfels, as of some other Austrian writers, seems to appear most conspicuously in the elaboration of details an elaboration that interferes perhaps at times with the clear presentment of fundamental ideas, but that is seldom without a real interest and significance. Apart from such interest in detail, however, the work of Ehrenfels has a pecu- liar importance in being probably the most systematic attempt that has yet been made to deal with Ethics as a branch of the theory of value. Such an attempt seems to the present reviewer to be full of significance. I am not, indeed, prepared to say that the idea of value is essentially the most fundamental conception in Ethics (as it may be in Economics). It is probable that the idea of an end or good will be the most persistent in ethical specula- tion, as it was the earliest. But at present there are some obvious 34