Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/541

 CHRISTIAN V. EHRENFELS, System der Werttheorie. 527 in the extreme form represented by Kant), seems to Ehrenfels to imply the recognition of absolute values, which he has already rejected. But on the other hand he thinks it premature to adopt the sceptical attitude towards Ethics which is implied in reducing it to a mere study of actually existing institutions and modes of action. He considers that we may avoid both extremes (the an- tagonism between which I cannot but think that Ehrenfels exaggerates) by regarding Ethics as essentially a branch of the theory of value. Of course this does not prevent the possibility of its being developed in the end into a normative science ; but, if so, its norms will probably be more modest and qualified than those conceived by Kant. And, in the first instance at any rate, it seems best to define Ethics simply as the psychology of the facts of moral valuation. On the basis of this definition Ehrenfels proceeds in the follow- ing chapter to attempt an analysis of the fundamental facts of moral valuation. The main points that are emphasised here appear to be the following. The moral judgment tends to be passed in the end on ' dispositions ' rather than on actions ; and those dispositions tend to have a positive value attached to them which promote the welfare of mankind in general, while those that hinder the general welfare have a negative value. The love of humanity in its various forms takes the first place as a disposi- tion that is positively valued ; but to this must be added Justice, Constancy, Honour, Sense of Duty, Truthfulness, Self-respect, Modesty, Chastity, Temperance, Diligence, Love of Work, and the like. All these are valued as instruments of social welfare. On the other hand Indifference is the chief root of evil, especially when it takes the form of Egoism or Ipsissimism (a perhaps not very happy term for exclusive devotion to some limited circle, such as the family, the nation, and the like). As regards the meaning of general welfare, Ehrenfels points out that there are various ways in which this may be understood. It may be under- stood purely with reference to feeling, as by the Utilitarians, or more definitely with reference to desire, or again more objectively as health ; and account ought to be taken of all these. The third chapter is concerned with the growth of the moral judgment. In dealing with this, Ehrenfels applies the conception of 'marginal utility,' which has been so fruitful in Economics. Moral valuations tend to be guided by the marginal good (Grenz- frommen) of the dispositions with which they are concerned. 1 Another point that is worth noting is the emphasis that Ehrenfels lays on the Love of Development (Liebe zur Entwicklung) as a moral disposition that it is specially important to cultivate, and that comes to be more and more valued (p. 104). The fourth chapter may be said to be concerned with moral institutions as embodying and enforcing moral valuations. The chief forms of these are moral maxims (commandments, and the 1 Cf. MIND, J.c., pp. 426-27.