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 PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 473 have often endeavoured to clear up this state of affairs, and to discover and establish real grounds for such naming. But as a matter of fact whole streams of those party-views and principles enter into philosophical systems, so that neces- sarily a great part of the lamented obscurity and confusion of terminology results from them. To a large extent the direct cause of this lies in the still existing dependence of these philosophical disciplines upon theology ; while this itself is only an especially strong instance of the meaning which is attributed to such doctrines in general public life, i.e. by every social will. The doctrines themselves are only social will in a sublimated form. Modern society and the modern State have indeed in a certain degree an interest in the scientific elaboration even of this sphere, in proportion as they tear themselves free from traditional moral forces, and still more when opposed to them. In proportion again as a scientifically grounded conviction of cultivated men can be serviceable to peace and order within society and the State to the natural content of the social will. Wherever that scientific elaboration has been ener- getically undertaken, then it has naturally had for its unani- mous opponents almost all those interconnecting parties. Even society at any rate in Europe has seldom become so conscious of itself as to demand a pure and strict moral science. But the State tacks between old and new social forces ; the more it makes use of the new as material sup- ports, the more it believes that it can entrust its moral supports only to the old. 68. The third argument against ordinary language is also still in force. Language is full of metaphorical expressions. And indeed there is a remarkable interaction between the names for physical (objective) and psychical (subjective) processes. A poetical or mythological mode of thought to which we have already referred works through language by personifying things, and by expressing and explaining what happens as their free activities ; on the other hand, by means of metaphors, the preponderating mass of psychical activities is materialised and therefore objectified, even by the habit of denoting a grammatical subject as " thing," while thinking of things as spatially extended or corporeal. Psychological terminology has to fight step by step with both these kinds of natural expression. It has already succeeded to a large extent in overcoming anthropomorphism, but uncertainties and relapses may yet be noticed everywhere. In the modern brilliant development of the psychology of sensations and ideas, a new and manifold application of figurative language