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 438 S. H. HODGSON : PSYCHOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHIES. that its explanatory power must be derived. The theory may therefore be held to be an instance of atavism, notwith- standing the obvious difference, that, in its new shape, the Mind is supposed, not merely to animate, but also to evolve Matter out of its own conceptual activity. Another great instance of the Mental Function theory of the Universe is afforded by Schopenhauer, the title of whose principal work, Die Welt als Wills, und Vorstellung, expresses that contrast between Keal Agency (Wille) and its phenomenal manifestation (Vorstellung}, of which what we call the Universe consists. The Will takes the place of the Kantian Thing-in-itself, the real but hidden agency which we ourselves, though self-conscious, really are, whatever else, as phenomenal beings, we may appear to ourselves and others to be. Self-consciousness, which is intelligence, enables us to arrive at the insight, that all Individualisation, and all our desires as individuals, are not our real being, but must be denied and renounced, if we would be free from illusion, disappointment, and pain, which are their necessary accompaniment. The selection of the Will as the mental function explanatory of the Universe gives, as might be expected, a practical rather than a speculative character to philosophy. It results in the precept, to merge the individual in the universal Will, and cease to exist in distinction from it. To this end the function of intelligence is merely instrumental. From these instances, which I do not attempt to criticise, I leave it to my hearers to judge, whether psychology is ever likely to furnish us with a conception or hypothesis, which will be a secure foundation for philosophy. The human conscious Subject, as it seems to me, is too small a part of the infinite and eternal whole, to be taken as a sample of all conscious Subjects which may possibly exist, and of whose nature we can form no positive conception whatever. And if not of the nature of the Subjects, still less can we form one of the nature of those experiences which constitute their several worlds. It is, therefore, hopeless, in my opinion, to attempt the solution of the philosophical problem by the way of psychological conceptions ; though by this I by no means intend to affirm, that a full speculative solution, such as is promised by the way of psychological conceptions, is really attainable by the way of philosophical analysis, or by any other way which may be devised. The only solution rationally attainable may, and probably will, be found to lie in ascertaining the nature of those limitations, by which the attainment of a full speculative solution is precluded.