Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/442

 428 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. would have done well to have avoided any allusion to the distinction between matter and spirit, which is a question for metaphysics. Psy- chology, like physics, is concerned with phenomena only and the order in which they occur.] Analyses et comptes rendus. May, 1899. F. lie Dantec. ' La The'orie Biochemique de 1'Heredite (n.).' [An attempt (too long to summarise) to prove in detail that the bio-chemical theory offers explanations of vital phenomena at least as complete as those offered by the vitalistic theory, while it enables us to predict phenomena of which the latter gives no hint.] Goblot. ' Fonction et Finalite (i.).' [Physiology, as a science, stands or falls with the conception of function, and function implies finality, subservience to ends. Only that property of living tissue is function which serves the end of its organisa- tion. Like causality, finality is only immediately known to us in con- sciousness. To the primitive man all non-egos are selves ; experience gradually teaches him to distinguish between persons, animals, plants and things. In the latter there is effort without intention, they are blind causes while man foresees and plans. Then comes a period of theological finalism ; the intelligent will originally regarded as immanent in things is now conceived as lying outside and beyond them. Biological mechanism belongs to this period ; living beings are artificial construc- tions presupposing an artificer. The final and scientific conception of causality is that of necessity, law. Uniformity of nature is the foundation of the Baconian induction. But if we are to understand vital phenomena we must view them not only under the form of causality but also of finality. The existence of science is the sole proof of the truth of the postulate on which it rests. The existence of physiology witnesses to the truth of the teleological order. But the teleological principle is particular only, not universal. Hence teleological induction is more complex, more difficult and perhaps more disputable than ordinary in- duction. It is a synthesis not an analysis.] J. Philippe. ' La Con- science dans 1'anesthesie chirurgicale.' [The evidence alike of surgeons and patients goes to prove that under the influence of anaesthetics the patient does not lose consciousness and often suffers pain, but on waking he has no recollection of his experiences.] Notes et discussions. Analyses et comptes rendus. June, 1899. L. Winiarski. ' L'Equilibre Esthe- tique.' [If we are to have a science of aesthetics we must generalise the immediate results of experience and reduce them to their common sub- stratum. The common substratum of aesthetic phenomena is nervoxis movement. We must also posit an ' aesthetic man ' who, by an abstraction, is considered as solicited solely by the idea of obtaining the maximum of aesthetic pleasure. Man may be considered as a material system endowed with biological energy. This energy constantly undergoes transformations until a position of equilibrium is established and all his wants are equally satisfied.] Marro. ' Le Bole Social de la Puberte.' [A comparative study of marriage customs among different peoples, tending to show that sexual selection plays an important part in con- tributing to the preservation and cultivation of such qualities as promote the evolution of societies.] Goblot. ' Fonction et Finalite ' (conclusion). [Constant coincidence is an indication of the presence of causality ; complex fitness of the presence of finality. Every end may be regarded as an advantage of some kind for something. In order that an end may be attained certain conditions must be fulfilled. But fitness affords a presumption only, not a proof of finality. Proof can be given by the 'method of the initial term'. Unlike the causal series, the final series has a beginning and an end. The importance of the initial term has been strangely overlooked. It is a need of the advantage afforded by