Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/383

 CAN THERE BE A SUM OP PLEASURES? 369 II. It is asserted that whereas the proposition "this pleasure is greater than that " has a meaning, the judgment is not quantitative. The idea that degree involves quantity is pronounced by Prof. Mackenzie a crude notion ; : but it is a crude notion which has commended itself (unless I greatly misunderstand them) to Kant, to Mr. Bosanquet (Logic, i., p. 118), and on the whole to Mr. Bradley. I do not propose to discuss the matter more in detail as a matter of pure Logic, but will simply refer to Mr. Bradley's very subtle paper on the question : " What do we mean by the intensity of psychical states? " in MIND, January, 1895. I do not underrate the difficulty, insisted upon by Mr. Bradley with his usual penetration, of saying exactly what it is that there is more of in one psychical state a state of pleasure or a state of heat than in another. But Mr. Bradley, though his dis- cussion is mainly aporetic, seems to be indisposed to deny that, however this question be answered, the judgment is quantitative (c/. Ethical Studies, p. 107). And I find it diffi- cult to treat seriously the assertion to the contrary. We certainly say : " This is more pleasant than that ". The position that the word more does not involve the idea of quantity is so startling that I must excuse myself from further discussion of it until it be developed in more detail than has been the case. Whatever be thought of the logical doctrine that degree does not involve quantity, it is enough for my present pur- pose if it be admitted that one whole state of consciousness of a certain character is pronounced more pleasant than another, provided it be conceded also : (a) that the total pleasure in each case is made up of a number of successive moments ; (b) that a certain degree of intensity is actually judged to be the equivalent of and may influence desire as the equivalent of a certain degree of duration : in other words, that a man in pursuit of pleasure may choose a less pleasure for a longer time rather than an intenser pleasure for a shorter time ; (c) that a whole pleasant state may be analysed into various distinguishable elements. The first two of these propositions can hardly, as it seems pleasures in any other sense. The greater durability of some other sources of satisfaction than others is no doubt an important reason for the higher value we attribute to them, but the consciousness enjoying even the most spiritual good must be in time ; the enjoyment of it can never be so far exhausted that we can say that an addition to it would be no addition to the good hitherto enjoyed. 1 Social Philosophy, p. 216. 24