Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/380

 360 HASTINGS BASHDALL: the particular pleasures which appeal to us ? That is quite true, but then of course that which gives me no pleasure will not satisfy my desire of pleasure ; nor shall I be much influenced by a desire for the pleasures which, though they are pleasant I care little about or which cannot be attained without sacrificing objects about which I care more than for such pleasures perhaps more than for any pleasure small or great. Or is it implied that, though I do desire all pleasant things which really are pleasant to me, I do not desire them in proportion to their pleasantness ? I agree, but that is only to say that I desire other things besides pleasure, and moreover that (speaking generally) the pleasures best worth having spring from the satisfaction of desires other than the desire for pleasure. All that has been admitted. What I contend for is that it is possible for a man to desire and that all or almost all men do desire pleasant things simply because they are pleasant, and that, ceteris paribus (where no difference of quality enters into the consideration and where no other desire would be thwarted) they desire the pleasanter things more than those that are less pleasant. That is what I understand to be meant by the assertion that pleasure (and not merely particular pleasures) is a possible object of desire. There is one more line of argument which I would briefly suggest. Will those who deny that we desire pleasure, maintain that we have no aversion to pain ? Here it can be hardly contended that it is merely certain particular psychical states which merely happen to be painful which inspire aversion, or that it is not the pain as such that we try to avoid, but merely the frustration of some other desire, of which pain is a mere accidental accompaniment. It is, of course, often the case that pain is the symptom of something organically wrong, and again that mental pains do largely result from the frustration of some desire. But there arej many conditions of body to which we should have no obj tion for any other reason than that they happen to be painful] Who would care about being told by a physiologist thajlj certain thrills are coursing down his nerves if they did noli reveal themselves in painful sensation : or that there was caries in his tooth if he could be sure that the tooth wouk" never become either painful or less useful ? If you will insist on abstracting the content of pain from the pain itself, it isj surely the pain that we avoid, not the content. We avoic pains, the content of which we know nothing about. W do not think it necessary to try new pains which we cannot without experience even picture to the imagination, undei