Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/357

 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 343 justification or explanation, what the method of infinitesi- mals justifies and explains. The method of limits presupposes* that the discrete is ultimately reducible to the continuous,! the finite to the infinite ; but it does not show, as the method of infinitesimals does, how the continuous develops the discrete, how the infinite constitutes the finite. Similarly in the metaphysics of Spinoza the unity of an all-compre- hensive system is presupposed throughout ; but the varieties of individual existence are not shown as proceeding from this system, as its logical development. The finite presup- poses the infinite, modes presuppose attributes, attributes presuppose substance ; but the infinite is reached by thinking away the varieties of the finite, the attribute is that which is common to all the modes, substantia in se or vere considerata is substantia depositis affectionibus. 1 Thus for Spinoza " de- termination is negation," " the determinate denotes nothing positive, but only a privation of the existence of that nature which is conceived as determinate". 2 Geometrical figures as definite figures are unreal, because their definiteness is dependent on other figures : their reality is indeterminate extension. And in general, definite quantities of any kind, separate parts, are unreal: real quantity, "as it is in the understanding," " as it is in itself," is infinite, indivisible and single [unica]. 3 The infinite is thus the basis of the finite, the continuous of the discrete ; but the reality of the infinite and continuous is conceived in such a way as to imply the unreality, and therefore the negation, of the finite and discrete. Not merely is it maintained that the infinite and continuous are not products of the finite and discrete, but it is implied that the finite and discrete are not really (as finite and discrete) products of the infinite and continu- ous. Now it is interesting to find that, in thus emphasising the unity of " extended substance " and real " quantity," as against the variety of finite "bodies" and "quantities," Spinoza says that the attempt to show that " extended substance is composed of parts or bodies really distinct from one another " is as absurd " as if one were to attempt by the mere addition and aggregation of many circles to make up a square or a triangle or something else totally different in essence " or to make a line out of points. 4 But the mathe- Hth., i., 5, deinonst. ; cf. Eth., ii., 10, Schol. 2: Res singulares non possunt sine Deo esse nee concipi ; et tamen Deus ad earuiu essentiam non pertinet. 8 Ep. 36, Van Vloten (41 Bruder). Ibid., 12, Van Vloten (29 Bruder). *Loc. cit.