Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/278

 264 NEW BOOKS. problem of importance suggested by the philosophical works of Leibniz which does not receive discussion and illustration somewhere or other in this admirable introduction. Particularly interesting and valuable is the elaborate examination of the influence of Leibniz upon later thinkers, notably upon Kant and Lotze. If there is any criticism one is tempted to pass upon so learned a discussion, it would be that, in view of English ignorance, the work of Herbart is scarcely discussed at sufficient length. After all, Herbart is not only more akin in spirit to Leibniz than most of his German successors, but may also fairly be said to be the one German philosopher of the great epoch, besides Kant, who is much more than a magni nominis umbra to-day. For both these reasons one could wish that Dr. Latta had treated of him in a way that would appeal rather to the many English students who are not acquainted with his works than to the few who are. And while one is about the task of criticism, there are two other minor matters one might mention in which Dr. Latta will hardly carry all his readers with him. His treatment of the relations between Leibniz and Spinoza errs perhaps through a natural charity to the memory of the author whom he has studied to such purpose. Nothing in Leibniz's life is less creditable, when judged by the ordinary standards of honourable men, than his constant endeavours to minimise the importance of Spinoza as a thinker, and his readiness to acquiesce in the popular prejudices against so "impious " a writer. On this point, the language of Mr. Pollock in his Spinoza seems not a whit too severe, and it is perhaps a pity that Dr. Latta should have repeated Leibniz's half patronising, half sanctimonious reflexions on his great contemporary without a word of censure. The other point is one of more importance. We hear a great deal in Dr. Latta's Introduction, as we are bound to hear in any account of Leibnitian metaphysics, of " activity " and " force " as constituting the real essence of bodies. But Dr. Latta, like Leibniz himself, omits to explain what " activity " and " force " stand for, over and above certain empirical facts which are ultimately reducible to terms of extension and rate of change of velocity. It is of course clear from what Leibniz and his editor say about Cartesianism that they understand by " force " and " activity " something very much more than convenient symbols for such facts about extension and acceleration, but neither seems prepared with an answer to the question how much more is meant. Yet one cannot but think that, in view of the loose way in which spiritualist writers such as Prof. James are accustomed to use these terms, they should either be rigorously denned or rigorously banished from our philosophical vocabulary. And would it be hypercritical to suggest that " Leibniz's far-reaching suggestion of the unconscious petites perceptions," so far from being such a service to psychology as Dr. Latta maintains, has really proved a damnosa hereditas of obscurity and confusion ? These are however but points of detail, and divergence of opinion about them is only to be expected. The fact remains that Dr. Latta has produced the most elaborate and learned work on Leibniz in the English language, a work for which all future students must be profoundly thankful, and which reflects the utmost credit on the author as well as on the University of Edinburgh, to which part of the Introduction was submitted as a doctoral thesis, and on the Clarendon Press which has undertaken the publication. A. E. TAYLOR.