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 192 G. E. MOOEE : indeed, Kant shows us, as certain as the empirical proposi- tions which Hume took to be alone certain. But its truth must be known independently of these, since it is involved also in false propositions of this type. It would, in fact, be true, whether any such propositions were true or not. Kant has only taught us that, if any of them are true, it must be so likewise. He failed to see that its truth may be asserted immediately on the same ground as theirs ; for he was misled by the previous course of philosophy to suppose that there was something more im- mediately indubitable in them. Their truth is, in fact, the last thing which common sense doubts, in spite of its familiarity with erroneous perceptions. Kant's merit was in pointing out, what he himself did not recognise, that their being undoubted does not prove them to be indubi- table ; or rather, that the doubt which is cast on some of them proves conclusively, what common sense, in its con- tentment with rules that have exceptions, does not perceive, that they are highly doubtful. Our result then is as follows : That a judgment is univer- sally a necessary combination of concepts, equally necessary whether it be true or false. That it must be either true or false, but that its truth or falsehood cannot depend on its relation to anything else whatever, reality, for instance, or the world in space and time. For both of these must be supposed to exist, in some sense, if the truth of our judgment is to depend upon them ; and then it turns out that the truth of our judgment depends not on them, but on the judgment that they, being such and such, exist. But this judgment cannot, in its turn, depend on anything else, for its truth or falsehood: its truth or its falsehood must be im- mediate properties of its own, not dependent upon any relation it may have to something else. And, if this be so, we have removed all reason for the supposition that the truth and falsehood of other judgments are not equally in- dependent. For the existential judgment, which is presup- posed in Kant's reference to experience or in Mr. Bradley 's reference to reality, has turned out to be, as much as any other, merely a necessary combination of concepts, for the necessity of which we can seek no ground, and which cannot be explained as an attribution to ' the given '. A concept is not in any intelligible sense an ' adjective,' as if there were something substantive, more ultimate than it. For we must, if we are to be consistent, describe what appears to be most substantive as no more than a collection of such supposed adjectives : and thus, in the end, the concept turns out to be