Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/203

 THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 189 propositions which assert a necessary relation, without any implication of existence whatever, of the type ' Body is heavy '. The only common element in all these different classes would seem to be that they all make assertions with regard to some empirical concept, i.e., a concept which can exist in an actual part of time. The second and third classes are mixed and involve necessity, because there is also included in them an assertion with regard to an a priori concept. To all of them Kant would seem to oppose as purely a priori propositions, those which make an assertion solely with regard to a priori concepts and which for that reason can imply no assertion of existence, since an a priori concept is one which cannot exist in the limited sense above ex- plained. The line of division, therefore, upon which Kant's Tran- scendentalism is based, would seem to fall between proposi- tions involving empirical concepts and those which involve none such ; and an empirical concept is to be defined, not as a concept given by experience, since all concepts are so given, but as one which can exist in an actual part of time. This division is necessary in order to include all the various kinds of propositions which Kant includes under the term empirical, many of which involve a priori concepts. If the division were to be based on the nature of the propositions, as such, as Kant pretends to base it, we saw that pure existential propositions alone could be thought to have a claim to form a class by themselves, as empirical propositions. These do indeed obviously form the basis of the other divi- sion ; for a simple concept cannot be known as one which could exist in time, except on the ground that it has so existed, is existing, or will exist. But we have now to point out that even existential propositions have the essen- tial mark which Kant assigns to a priori propositions that they are absolutely necessary. The distinction of time was said to be ultimate for an existential proposition. If this is so, it is obvious that neces- sary propositions, of the kind which Kant endeavours to establish in the ^Esthetic, are involved in them. It was pointed out that a pure existential proposition could only assert the existence of a simple concept ; all others involving the a priori concepts of substance and attribute. If now we take the existential proposition " Ked exists," we have an example of the type required. It is maintained that, when I say this, my meaning is that the concept " red " and the concept " existence " stand in a specific relation both to one another and to the concept of time. I mean that " Bed