Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/192

 178 G. E. MOORE : judge at all on Mr. Bradley's theory, a part of this character must have been " cut off and fixed by the mind ". But my question is, whether we can thus cut off a part of the character of our ideas, and atttribute that part to something else, unless we already know, in part at least, what is the character of the idea from which we are to cut off the part in question. If not, then we have already made a judgment with regard to the character of our idea. But this judgment, again, requires, on Mr. Bradley's theory, that I should have had an idea of my idea, and should have already cut off a part of the content of that secondary idea, in order that I may make a judgment with regard to the character of the primary idea that is in question. And similarly it is quite impossible that I should know what the content of my secondary idea is, until I have made it in its turn the object of a third idea, by taking part of this tertiary content. And so on ad infinitum. The theory would therefore seem to demand the completion of an infinite number of psycho- logical judgments before any judgment can be made at all. < jr/bJ* But such a completion is impossible ; and therefore all judgment is likewise impossible. It follows, therefore, if we are to avoid this absurdity, that the ' idea used in judgment ' must be something other than a part of the content of any idea of mine. Mr. Bradley's theory presupposes that I may have two ideas, that have a part of their content in common ; but he would at the same time compel us to describe this common part of content as part of the content of some third idea. But what is gained by such a description? If the part of content of this third idea is a part only in the same sense, as the common part of the other two is a part of each, then I am offering an explanation which presupposes that which was to be explained. Whereas if the part, which is used in explanation, is a part in the only sense which will make my explanation significant, i.e., an existent part, then it is difficult to see how that which belongs to one idea can also come to belong to other ideas and yet remain one and the same. In short, the idea used in judgment is indeed a ' universal meaning ' ; but it cannot, for that very reason, be described as part of the content of any psychological idea whatever. These difficulties, which are of the same nature as the famous T/HTO? avQpTro<; urged against the hypostasised Pla- tonic ideas, inevitably proceed from trying to explain the concept in terms of some existent fact, whether mental or of any other nature. All such explanations do in fact pre- suppose the nature of the concept, as a genus per se, irre-