Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/150

 VII. PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. PHILOSOPHICAL KEVIEW. Vol. vii., No. 4. J. 'Watson. ' The Meta- physic of Aristotle. iv.' [Potential and actual reality. To explain experience, we must grant the distinction of potential and actual reality. The relation between the two is found by way of a consideration of the 'possible'. The potential is persistent tendency towards the actual. In knowledge, in time, and in substance, the actual is prior to the potential, iv. The divine, reason. While there is, within the sphere of the sensible or transitory, a continual process, the process is not self- explaining. A true cause must exist as self-dependent, and must express itself (or be actually originative). But it must not lose itself in expression ; it must be eternally self -manifesting and self-identical. Aristotle finds it in the divine reason. " God ... is eternal, unchange- able, self-dependent, self -originative, self-knowing and immaterial, the first and final cause of the whole process of the universe."] C. M. Bakewell. ' Pluralism and the Credentials of Monism.' [A rambling essay, whose thesis is that " we would (sic) like to be pluralists, if only we could at the same time satisfy the imperious claims of reason," and which concludes that " the world must be conceived as altogether coherent and interdependent in so far as free individuals do not freely act in it. Such individuals must, however, be conceived as capable of so acting, capable of interrupting sequences, of changing the history of the world at least to some extent."] A. H. Lloyd. ' Epistemology and Physical Science : a Fatal Parallelism.' [Episternology is separated from the physical sciences by the dualism of mind and matter. But it retains the same dualism within itself, in the opposition of subject and object, thinker and thought. And the sciences do the same thing : chemistry, in its conserved matter and atoms ; physics, hi its matter as medium and moving particles ; mathematics, with infinite quantity and finite quantities. The cure is that all alike cease " to divorce form from content".] W. Q. Everett. 'The Evaluation of Life.' [The worth of life is ultimately measured in terms of affective process. At the same time, " over against the peculiarly subjective and passive ele- ment of feeling, in which all experience is evaluated as good or evil, must be placed the objective and active phase of conscious life, by which all experiences are constituted good or evil ". Critique of Alexander and Schiller.] Discussions. J. E. Russell and J. H. Tufts. ' Episte- mology and Mental States.' Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. Vol. vii., No. 5. E. B. Titchener. structural, functional and genetic, and their distribution in modern litera- ture. Postulates of an anatomical psychology are the processes sensation, idea, affection, and the attributes quality, intensity, duration, extension, clearness. Brentano, James, Stout, as psychologists of function.] A. K. Rogers. 'Epistemology and Experience.' [To the Hegelian position that "reality is experience and that all the categories of reality are distinctions within the process of experience " the author opposes the
 * The Postulates of a Structural Psychology.' [The three psychologies,