Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 8.djvu/140

 126 NEW BOOKS. are special studies in sociology rather than philosophical discussions. 'The article entitled " Souvenirs de transports judiciaires " is a charming little " causerie," reminiscences of the author's experiences as a " juge d'instmction ". The title might be paraphrased Scoticd as " Recollec- tions of a Procurator-fiscal's official journeys". M. Tarde complains pathetically that criminals have so often chosen such lovely spots for their crimes. Another essay deals, and seeks to deal scientifically, with "Graphology". M. Tarde suggests that we may practise the maxim "know thyself" by studying our own writing; and his "advice to those .about to marry" more necessary perhaps in France than in this country is " Never ask the hand of a young person without having examined some specimens of her writing ". There is also a brief, sym- pathetic notice of M. Henri Hazel's interesting but rather unscientific book, La synergic sociale, and a review of Prof. Gidding's Principles of -Sociology. The other four essays are longer, and occupy nearly all the first half of the volume. They are entitled "La Sociologie " (an essay on the nature and methods of the science), " Les deux elements de la Sociologie " (i.e., the primary social fact and the primary social unit), "Le transformisme social" (an elaborate review of Prof, de Greef's work), and " L'idee de 1'organisme sociale ". These four essays go over much the same ground as Les Lois Sociales, and give perhaps a clearer, because less abstract, view of the author's theories. Of the Lois de V Imitation a very full and careful analysis was given by Mr. Thomas Whittaker in MIND for July, 1890 (O. S., vol. xv.), and a brief account of La Logique Sociale will be found in the number for January, 1895 (N. S., vol. iv). Any detailed exposition of the volumes before us is therefore unnecessary, and a few points only will be noticed. M. Tarde regards sociology as " collective psychology " ; Comte con- ceived it as a social physics ; Mr. Spencer has treated it as a social biology ; but the worst notion (whose the reader is left to guess) is that which makes it a social ideology (Etudes, p. 92). For the famous meta- phor of the social organism K. Tarde has little toleration. He calls it " a notion unanimously discredited" (ib., p. 121). If so, what need to criticise it so fully ? But the criticisms are very good. It is pointed out that every individual is the member of several societies at once (ib., pp. 122, 187) ; that a society may change its fundamental credo, which, if it were an organism, wmld mean changing its species (ib., p. 221). It is noted that terms such as " colony," " parasitism," " division of labour," " organisation," were applied to society before they were transferred to plants or animals (ib., p. 128). Society is, in fact, less obscure and difficult to understand than life (ib., pp. 11, 99). Such criticisms are just and valuable ; but does not M. Tarde go too far in denying almost any value to the biological categories of organism and evolution as applied to society? The primary social fact M. Tarde holds to be "imitation" which is the psychological form of the universal principle of " repetition ". Sociologists have erred by looking at the general and abstract aspects of social phenomena, and neglecting the particular and individual. "Socially everything that is general was at first individual" (ib., p. 32). All institutions, customs, etc., have originated as individual "inventions," and have spread from individual to individual. True ; but does not M. Tarde, in his horror of biological sociology, fall back upon physical and even mathematical metaphors ? Ideas and customs are thought of as ing from other centres, which thus " interfere " with them. Out of this combination of "repetition" and "opposition" comes the "adaptation"
 * l radiating " from a centre ; they may be met by opposite ideas, radiat-