Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/82

 66 ALICE JULIA HAMLIN : of course, we find very considerable disagreements among the authorities. On the one hand, there is a fundamental divergence of opinion due to the diverse theories of will held by different schools of psychology. On the other hand, we notice many differences in statement that owe their existence more to different uses of terminology than to any real discrepancy in theory. We have, in fact, a quadruple confusion ; divergence on the relation of impulse to will, and on both sides of this divergence confused and inconsistent uses of the term " impulse ;> ; divergence, again, on the relation of instinct to impulse, and again much con- fusion in the definitions of both terms. We cannot hope finally to disentangle this snarl of conflicting statements. But by selecting typical instances and recalling the different interpretations of "impulse," we shall gather up what is most important for our present purpose. As representatives of those w r ho regard will as the funda- mental process of mind, and impulse as a manifestation of will, we take Wundt and Hoffding. The following quota- tions give Wundt's position. He defines impulse as "that in which sensation and will are operative in a fundamental connexion". Thus it is "the actual element of all mental activity". 1 "Impulse is a simple act of willing unequivo- cally determined by a single feeling." - Holding impulse to be the primal and elementary reaction of the mind to external stimuli, Wundt goes on to say : "Individual develop- ment supports the general theory that voluntary acts have not developed out of reflexes, but that reflexes are stable and mechanised acts of will ". 3 Instinctive action is also impulsive, that is, voluntary action ; and however far back we may go we shall not find anything to derive it trcni except similar, if simpler, acts of will. 4 Hoffding agrees with Wundt in making will the funda- mental andorigiualform of consciousness. 5 And he alsomakes instinct a manifestation of impulse. But, unlike Wundt, he holds instinct to be more primitive than any other manifesta- tion of will, whereas Wundt derives instinct from preceding acts of impulse. Hence impulse with Wuudt may be reaction to a sensation without consciousness of the end to which the action is directed ; while with Hoffding impulse is conscious of its end, and it is only instinct which acts blindly. 6 * 1 Op. cit., ii, p. 640. - Philosophised Studien, vi., p. 376. 3 Physiologische Psychologic, ii., p. 591. 4 Human and Animal Psychology, tr., p. 409.
 * Hoffding's Psychology, tr., p. 99. 6 Op. cit., p. 323.