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 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. 583 axis of the body holds only for the extremities. Valentin's law that the relative limiiial values at different parts of the cutaneous surface are approximately equal holds only in a very rough way. Vierordt's law of the relation of the limen to movement does not hold. Volkmann's law that practice of any part practises the symmetrical part is true as far as it goes : really, however, the practice results are more widely diffused. This ' practice ' is a process ' of the fulfilment of an autosuggestion in the consciousness of the subject '. The illusory perception of two points (puzzle experiment) is a product of the autosuggestion set up by practice. The way is paved for autosuggestion by " abstraction from the objective impression and its visual complications, and by the aim of making the limen as small and exact as possible ".] M. Arrer. ' Ueber die Bedeutung der Convergenz und Accommodat ionsbewegungen fur die Tiefenwahrnehmung (11.).' [Estimation of depth has a variety of conditions. Yet the results of all experiments point to the constant operation of a single factor. Now the particular form of the limited field of vision was different in all the sets of experiments ; the distance- object varied ; the brightness varied in Wundt's experiments, though not in Hildebrand's. We have left the movements of convergence and accommodation : and these did, in fact, furnish the measure of com- parison for the depth ideas. An exhaustive and extremely careful paper.] R. von Schubert-Soldern. ' Erwiderung auf Prof. Wundt's Aufsatz ueber na'iven und kritischen Eealismus.' [Wundt has wrongly bracketed names together ; confused critical with naive realism, etc. The relation of experience and consciousness ; criticism of Wundt and Rickert. The problem of transcendence : " solipsism is epistemo- logically undeniable, but practically or causally nonsensical". Critique of Wundt's statement that primitive experience is " not the object that lies within, but the object that lies without consciousness".] W. Wundt. 'Einige Bemerkungen zu vorstehendem Aufsatze.' [Meets the above objections point by point.] VlEETELJAHRSSCHRIFT FUR WlSSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Jahrg. xxi., HeftS. A. Riehl. 'Bemerkungen zu dem Problem der Form in der Dichtkunst (i.).' [Exposition of A. Hildebrand's theory of art. Objects seen in the far distance with parallel optical axes are presented with a unity and completeness whick is impossible in near vision. It is the aim of sculpture and painting to present their objects with the same kind of unity and completeness : to reproduce rather the ideal image than the perception. This unity and completeness must belong not merely to the separate items of a picture or sculpture, but to the picture or sculpture as a whole.] O. Krebs. ' Der Wissenschaftsbegriff bei H. Lotze (Schluss).' [Lotze's attitude to the method of Hegel and of the materialists and to universal methods in general. Criticism of Lotze's views on scientific methods. Distinction between common-sense and science according to Lotze. His view of the object of science, as consisting in problems. He demands a preliminary sifting of scientific questions from those which are not scientific, but does not fulfil his own requirement. Indeed, in his Philosophy of .Religion and elsewhere, he treats as problems of science questions which, on his own showing, ought to be excluded as unscientific. His monistic position irreconcilable with his views on the nature of science.] R. Willy. ' Die Krisis in der Psy- chologie (in.).' [Criticism of Breiitano's distinction between simple apprehension and judgment, and of his doctrine of intentional in-exist- ence, with special reference to Twardowski's pamphlet on Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellunyen. Criticism of similar doctrines in Stumpf