Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/556

 540 D. G. KITCHIE : vi., 2, 5 (1139 a 35), that "intellect by itself is not an efficient cause of action ". In order that action may follow upon an in- tellectual conviction there must be ope&s present in the mind. Trpooipeo-ts is vovs ope/crt/cos. This is not repeated in vii., 3, but it certainly seems to be taken for granted. Aristotle has got beyond the Platonic antithesis between Eeason and Feeling (which Mr. Fairbrother wrongly attributes to him on p. 363). Eeason, he sees, is not all on the side of the good ; nor feeling all on the side of evil (cf. Eth. Nic., iii., 1, 24, 27, 1111 a 30; b 1, Scl Se /cat Opyie0-0at fTTL TUTL KO.I CTTiOvfJiflv TIVWV . . . CU C 7TpaetS TOV OvOpWITOV O.TTO Ovp.av KOI Tri6vfuas ope/cri/cov //.erexei TTCOS Aoyov) : and he now recognises also that there could be no discord between them, unless they came together (vii., 3, 10, a~vp.fia.ivei VTTO Xoyov TTOJS KOL 8d^s aKpo/revecr&u). The acts of the a/cpa-nfc are the working out of a practical syllogism as well as the acts of the ey/cpar*;?. The a/cpai-??? acts out a maxim which in itself is not opposed to the maxim of the ey/cpar?;?. The a/cdAaoros has bad principles major premises that are opposed to those of the ey/cpar*?? ; the a/cpanys has good principles, but, as already shown, does not carry them out, while he does carry out principles of pleasantness, of gratification of desire, not in them- selves opposed to good principles, but per accidens in particular circumstances. There is no logical opposition between the prin- ciple " Excess is to be avoided " and the principle " Sweet things are pleasant " (and therefore, it is assumed, to be enjoyed unless there is any reason to the contrary. Aristotle is no ascetic, and is quite ready to admit that pleasure is dyaOov, though not the good, Eth. Nic., vii., 13, . 1, 1153 b 4, cf. x., 4, 10, 1175 a 16, evAoyws ovv /cat T^S fjSovrjs ec/>tevrai SC. aVavres). But in a particular case there may come to be a practical conflict, e.g., " This (the third bottle of port, the nineteenth cup of tea, or to use an ex- ample that fits Aristotle's illustration better the fourth piece of sugar in the tea) is excess for me," is in practical conflict with the minor premise of the syllogism of pleasantness : and the minor premise of the syllogism of self-control may be overlooked and neglected, owing to the attention being concentrated on the minor premise, " This is sweet," through the influence of appetite and desire. To make the use of the practical syllogism in 9- 11 fit in perfectly with what was said in 6, it should have been noted that each of the two syllogisms of 9-11 admits of an analysis into a subjective and an objective aspect such as was given in 6. The practically opposing conclusions, that is to say, are the complex propositions, " This act (here and now) is excess for me," " This act (here and now) is pleasant for me". All that has been said in the preceding sections is not superseded by 9-11, but is supplemented and completed by them. Aristotle is thus able to recognise the truth in the Socratic