Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/554

538 take a medical "maxim" such as " A dry diet is good for all".

This maxim is capable of analysis into two propositions : "(1) All men are benefitedby dry food ;

(2) All dry food is good for men ".

But if a practical application of this maxim is to be made, i.e., a recognition that some particular act (a "this ") is to be done by some particular person (an "I"), there must be two minor premises:

"(1) I am a man; (2) This is dry food ".

If either of these should be forgotten or left out of sight, the conclusion " I am benefited by this " will not be drawn. Only when this conclusion is in the mind and actively present in consciousness will conduct be affected. If, therefore, either of the minor premises is not in the mind or not actively present in consciousness, the practical conclusion fails to be drawn. Aristotle does not mean to regard this leaving out of sight of a particular as an "innocent mistake in application" (as Mr. Fairbrother supposes, p. 365). Ignorance of the particular excuses (iii., 1, 15, 1110 b 30), but not carelessness about the particular or neglect of it. It is a pity that Mr. Stewart has illustrated vii., 3, 6 by a case of ignorance (that sherry contains acid) and not by a case of the non-application of knowledge. Of course either ignorance of the minor premise or forgetfulness of it will prevent the conclusion being drawn ; but it is the forgetfulness which is relevant to the explanation of. In the practical syllogism of Eth., vi., 7, 7 (1141 b 18), ignorance of the minor premise is to the point: in vii., 3, 6, ignoring or not applying the minor is the explanation of. If genuine ignorance could be proved, the person would not be blamed. The is not the person who does not know that too much alcohol intoxicates, but the person who does not attend to the fact that he is drinking too much. The practical syllogism, it may here be noted, is clearly to be understood in the light of what is said in ''Eth. Nic.'', vi., 2, 2, 1139 a 21 : Pursuit of this, avoidance of that are treated for convenience of analysis as equivalent to the propositions "This is good," "That is bad". Aristotle must not be understood to hold the absurd view that there is no syllogism unless the premises are clearly formulated in words. means simply "inference," "conclusion". Thus, wherever a principle ( = major premise) can be found in a particular action, wherever at least actions are due to conceptions of ends (cf. De An., iii., 11, 434 a 5, seq.), the action admits of analysis as a syllogism with a universal major and a singular minor, or as a series of syllogisms in which the conclusion is always more particular than the major premise.