Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/550

 534 J. D. LOGAN : higher category. But the ' naturalness ' of the higher life is in nowise to be construed in terms of ''determinism". For, so I like to put it, spontaneity, as, in a sense, " inform- ing " the mind of the Self as to the inadequacy of its present character, and certainly, again, defining the direction of possibility, is, in virtue of such functions, as it were, the "regulative" aspect of Personality; while Freedom, on the other hand, is its " constitutive " aspect. But these, it must be, are but two and inseparable aspects of the Moral Person, or the Will to Live. And now Freedom is proper, it shall be, to the nature of Personality : is the prerogative or birth- right of the Moral Person ! We shall therefore interpret Fixity of Character, Spon- taneity of moral life, as but the absolute negation of the original "potentiality of opposites". And, again, just be- cause this second or higher nature, the latest Form of the Will to Live, has become precisely what it is by a definite process, we cannot interpret it in terms of determinism. For the fact that self-initiations or choices "crystallise" and give " fixity " to character, in no way exemplifies a loss of Will power ; but rather the Will's full possession of pure and definite quality, as being now really a Will. Is it not, at least, a significant fact that " the strongest and deepest natures are the saints and the sinners " 9 1 And surely that which works "without a conscience or an aim" is much less a Will than that which manifests strength and fixed purpose ! There were infinite possibilities of either good or bad ; there cannot always be the possibility of infinite fluc- tuations without Moral Freedom and Moral Responsibility losing their meaning. Towards Fixity of Character, or spontaneity of moral life, as we now understand them, the energy of the Self has been working. Its Self-initiation means this at last. And if it did not mean this, not even proper Self-initiation there's the significance of Fixity, Spontaneity, as " in forming " the mind of the Self with reference to Ideals and significant Values, as, in short, the " regulative " aspect of Personality in defining the direction of possibility ! not even proper Self-initiation could be guaranteed ; or, at least, the Self-initiation would be alto- gether superfluous, nay, even frustrating so far as moral progress is concerned, just because it guarantees nothing. But that Self-initiation should guarantee a newer Form of Will, and this in turn guarantee proper Self -initiation, this seems to me to give Responsibility a lurid meaning. And 1 J. Seth, op. cit. sup., p. 56.