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 FIXITY OF CHARACTER: ITS ETHICAL INTERPRETATION. 529 non -compulsion ab extra is fundamental and essential. Nay, non-compulsion ab extra, as the prius, is, therefore, the condition of the possibility of contingency ; and so far the power of free and incalculable self -initiation must define itself, not in the direction of contingency, but in that of non-compulsion ab extra. The possibility of choice of alter- natives may or may not be an element in Freedom. But the essential or necessary element is simply the full con- sciousness of possibility, of ideal future or end, whether that be contrasted dynamically with another end or not. Freedom lies in that situation precisely, whereas it is said, " man is not, like the animal, merely ' aware ' of tendencies that sway him : he ' knows ' them and whither they lead ". 1 The significance of this knowledge of the meaning of one's impulsive tendencies, etc., lies in its making the impulsive tendencies one's own motive, and in thus differentiating the kind of motivation of the Will. The question of Freedom, then, narrows itself down to the question of the kinds of motivation, to the possibility of motivation of the Will ab intra. The determination of the Will being admitted, the question is as to the source and kind of determination pos- sible. Now reflex and ideo-motor action exhibit mechanical causation from beginning of process to its end. Unless, therefore, the causal chain be broken, so as to give the Self opportunity to read aright the 'situation,' to 'know' one's tendencies and whither they lead, unless, that is, an appreciable or properly Self-conscious element becomes part of the process the causal chain must remain mechanical throughout : the motivation remaining external and efficient simply, the case for Freedom must be given up. But now, as a matter of psychological fact, 2 the process of volition exhibits three stages : periods of inhibition, of deliberation, and of decision or motivation. The mechani- cally causal chain, in all the higher intellectual activities, is broken just at the point of inhibition ; and this moment of inhibition offers opportunity for reflexion and the concep- tion of the meaning of the situation, the conception of an ideal future or end, as having an appreciable quality or value, and which may become one's own. And just here the inclination, propension, or what not, that would immediately seek its own end instinctively or by pure impulsion, loses its character of mere inclination or impulsion, is referred con- 1 J. Seth, op. cit., p. 49. 2 See James's Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., cap. 26 ; Hoffding's Out- lines of Psychology, cap. vii., English trans. ; Hyslop, Phil. Review, vol. i., 4, July, 1892. 34