Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/542

 V. FIXITY OF CHARACTER: ITS ETHICAL INTERPRETATION. BY J. D. LOGAN. IN this day of destructive philosophical criticism one fails to wonder at the ever-increasing metamorphoses of the ' central problem ' of Ethics. Indeed we are still seeking the central problem itself. Now we are told that the problem of Freedom, for instance, has disappeared, and " exists only for a theological or scholastic philosophy ". And now it is asserted that " after all Free-will is not the highest Freedom ". And now another holds that there may be Freedom (of Self-initiative) " whether there be any choice between alternatives or not"; and that Responsibility is successfully gaining recognition as the central problem of Ethics. Finally, the Absolutist submits that Freedom, if it means anything, must imply that I, at any time in my life, character and environment notwithstanding, can choose the " law of death " equally with the " law of life": or that, on the other hand, if Freedom does not imply this, it must be at best a disguised Determinism. Just here in the position of one who is a Freedomist, but not of the Absolutist type appears the paradox, dress- ing, as it is said, Determinism in the garb of Freedom, Fixity of character, continuity of life, we are told, mean this. And can we escape Prof. James Seth's conclusion? "The moral crises of our lives are few," he says, " and soon over ; but it seems as if all the strength of our spirit gathered itself up for such supreme efforts, and as if what follows in the long-drawn years were but their consequence." 1 Here is a hint of universal causation : character moves along lines fixed by a single act, a single choice : the ' crisis ' means this. But, on the other hand, we are accustomed to think that an " evil character, however evil, being the formation of 1 Jas. Seth, A Study of Ethical Principles, p. 54.