Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/46

 30 A. E. TAYLOR : ence for that interpretation of the world's unity from which it is deduced, by showing that it leaves room for the relative truth of the everyday judgment of sense and its elaboration into non-philosophical physical science ; and (2) it affords a clear and striking picture of the perplexities which beset this non-philosophic thought in its attempts to be consistent with itself. Xo better description has ever, so far as I know, been given of the baffling aspect the world must wear for an understanding which, failing to grasp the conception of its organic unity as a systematic interrelation of systems, has to take spatial continuity for unity, and the vague sense of "likeness" and " unlikeness " for identity and difference. On this topic I have, however, said all that seemed necessary a few pages back ; I will only add two other remarks. (1) That it will help us to appreciate the hypothesis better if we think of the transformations produced in the appearance of familiar objects when seen under the microscope (compare Plato's own image at 165 c, iroppwOev opwv-n . . . eyyvdev VOOVVTL /rrX). (2) That the description of the OJKOL of this hypothesis is by itself enough to show that the ra cia of the dialogue represent the sensible world (see above, MIND, vol. v., pp. 483-4). The ninth and last hypothesis (165 E-166 c) need not occupy us very long. It starts once more from the proposi- tion "the One has no reality," "there is no such thing as the One". That is, it makes the assumption of a thorough- going sensationalistic Pluralism, and proceeds to draw a sketch of the world as it must consistently be thought of on such a theory. And we see that the world of indefinite plurality itself is for the consistent Pluralist unthinkable. For we admit that the manifold are in no sense one ; and it is not very hard to see that for the same reason they cannot be many. For a manifold is a multiplicity of ones. Nothing added to nothing ever so many times will not produce any- thing but itself (165 E). Thus ra aa are on the Pluralism's hypothesis neither one nor many. Nor can we even fall back on the results of the last hypothesis, and say they appear to be one or many. For we have pledged ourselves to the entire and utter unreality of unity. We are therefore not in a position to allow it even the subordinate reality of being an object of " fancy " or " opinion ". What is nothing at all cannot even be a philosopher's day-dream. Thus not even in delusive appearance does the world seem to be either one or many. And a similar criticism may be passed on every other positive or negative predicate that is proposed for our acceptance. If unity be unreal, so is everything else.