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 NEW BOOKS. 423 correct ; but it is surely out of place to set them down in dogmatic form in a very elementary introduction to the subject. It is also very unfair to himself, as he has no opportunity for an adequate statement of the reasons which have led him to his theories. In chap. vi. there is an interesting discussion of Conation and Attention. Prof. Titchener maintains that there is nothing in these experiences, qua experiences, which cannot be reduced to Sensation and Affection. The reason he assigns is simply that introspection cannot find anything else. It is needless to say that we think him wrong on this point. He has not, in our opinion, correctly stated the problem which is to be submitted to introspection. But, after all, this is by comparison a minor question. What is of primary psychological importance is the account given of the nature of Conation as a process rather than as an 'experience. On this side of the question Prof. Titchener is to our mind more satisfactory, though by no means completely so. He admits the existence of natural and of acquired tendencies. "The nervous system," he says, "has, in every individual case, certain definite leanings, a bias in certain definite directions " (p. 110). Again, " Mind is a stream of processes flowing between banks, through channels which are now deep-cut and now shallow, which lead now in this direction and now in that, which now incline easily downwards and now run in the same level " (p. 113). This is excellent as far as it goes. But Prof. Titchener has failed, in our opinion, to realise the paramount importance of these tendencies in the treatment of the whole range of psychological problems. For instance, he makes no reference to them in discussing the fundamental conditions of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Prof. Titchener also appears to us to be on a wrong track, inasmuch as he constantly blurs the distinction between Sensation, Perception and Idea. These are all, according to him, sensations, and " the sensations aroused centrally do not differ as psycho- logical processes from those aroused peripherally " (p. 148). Whether or not the neural processes corresponding to Sensation and Idea occupy the same brain-tracts, it seems obviously and undeniably wrong to affirm that they are psychologically identical processes. At any rate, the state- ment is very apt to mislead the beginner. In spite of such criticisms as these, we must assert with emphasis that Prof. Titchener has executed a very difficult task with much skill. It is a very difficult task to write a really elementary book on Psychology ; a book which shall give really clear, definite and distinct teaching, and yet be fully intelligible to the beginner. In the main, Prof. Titchener has succeeded in doing this. In certain respects, as we have seen, there is room for material improvement : but as the work is already passing into a second edition, and is likely to pass into more, the author will have abundant opportunity to revise and improve it. G. F. S. The Works of Joseph Butler, D.C.L., sometime Lord Bishop of Durham. Edited by the Eight Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE. Oxford, 1896. Studies Subsidiary to the Works of Bishop Butler. By the Eight Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE. Oxford, 1896. All that magnificence of paper, type, and margin can do for these volumes has been done for them by the Clarendon Press. Mr. Glad- stone's edition of Butler will long continue the Classical Edition of Butler the edition which no gentleman's library or rather (since in these days ' gentlemen ' do not collect Libraries) no Public Library should be without. Mr. Gladstone's Annotations containing in extenso