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 398 CRITICAL NOTICES: significant wealth for the sake of current conscious needs, belongs once more to the most teleological aspect of the conscious process. From this point of view present consciousness appears, in relation to past consciousness, as a present construction through the use of former syntheses. That such is the character of the recall in case of rational trains of consciousness is well made out by our author, although, once more, the causation of the process is not to be made clear by any study of its meaning. On the basis of such analyses, our author proceeds to a study of the thinking process proper, in its relation to language. Into this latter study I should be indeed very glad to enter did the limits of this paper permit. But the opportunity given to me has already been far too extensively used ; I cannot venture to trespass further. There is space only for a summary statement of my attitude towards all such analyses. On the whole I accept them thoroughly and admiringly, precisely in so far as they are analyses of the immanent teleological constitution of the stream of consciousness, and of its various momentary and serial parts and regions. Such analysis is, moreover, of importance far beyond the range of psy- chology proper. It is a relief to meet with a psychologist who thoroughly appreciates that consciousness is not a mere flight of more or less associated contents, but is normally an organised system, or a series of such systems. To be sure, our author, in these days, is not alone, but his companions are still none too numerous ; and there is certainly room for just such Analytic Psy- chology. But all such analysis is like a critical study of the actual constitution of a work of art ; it is essentially immanent and teleological analysis ; it does not and cannot furnish us with causal explanations. It cannot tell how the work of art is causally pro- duced or sustained. Its laws, although socially verifiable, are here still laws of the inner conditions which make meaning possible. They are, therefore, essentially conditional laws. If meaning is to be possible, then consciousness has to be such, in its moments and in its series, that the whole appears as furnishing a schema that gets implicit expression through the parts. If consciousness is to possess such meaning, consciousness cannot be merely a series of associated images. If consciousness is to express per- sonal life, cognition must be the embodiment of conation, ends must appear in consciousness as progressively attained, and con- scious life must be viewed as an evolution of plans, and as a pur- suit of ideals. A thorough-going analysis of mental life from this point of view is not only possible ; it is one essential part of the work of a complete descriptive psychology. Yet I cannot believe that this one reaches an insight into the causal laws of mind. Yet I may, nevertheless, go further, and may say plainly that I fully believe that one does thus reach truth, that is, metaphysi- cally speaking, much deeper than any truth expressible in causal terms. In trying to sunder the two aspects that our author, to my mind, seems to confuse, I have really meant to vindicate what