Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/41

Rh It should be noticed first of all that Plato is careful to mark the intimate connexion of the present argument with the great second hypothesis by reverting here, and here only, to the principle which had been laid down in 3, the annexe and continuation of 2. That principle is once more, for the second and last time in the dialogue, affirmed at 162 B. The One, we began by assuming, "is not"; that is, it can have negative predicates, and so is not the only reality : also, as we have seen, "it is"; that is, because you can say something negatively you must also be able to say something positively about it. Thus, it " partakes " both of being and not-being. Consequently, just as was argued at 155 E-156 A, these two complementary sides of its full nature will fall apart in time. It will, in fact, change. And change is movement. "The One" is thus once more shown to be the exact reverse of that "moveless and changeless holy image" of Eleatic and Megarian adoration ; its life, far from being an unbroken eternity of empty self-sameness, involves the repeated transition from affirmation to negation, from felt and present unity to an existence which, while still real, is to perception lost and suspended in indefinite plurality. In experience it is sometimes the unity of the system, but also sometimes the immense variety and complexity of its parts, which obtrudes itself upon our notice. And yet there is also a sense in which we may deny all we have just affirmed. For the One not only is, but, by hypothesis, it also is not. Not only, that is, is the one reality that which makes itself known to us in every moment of our experience ; it is also that which is never and at no moment in its fulness present to us. And viewed in this light it is one and changeless. For it (a) is nowhere, and consequently cannot undergo change of place ; and (b) it is not contained in anything (, 162 ), and consequently cannot rotate. Nor (c) can the One, regarded as the ultimate unity of all things, know qualitative change; were it to alter its character it would no longer be the One. Thus we may assert with equal right (a) the one reality includes change and motion ; (b) the one reality is changeless and motionless (163 ). Becoming and decay will, of course, follow the fate and share the fortunes of change and motion. So that finally the " One," even though we attach negative predicates to it, may be said in one sense to experience, in another sense not to experience, becoming and decay. With this result our demonstration is complete (163 ). We have faced the difficulty which was already latent in 2, and shown that the partial negation of the One which was there implied