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 G. F. STOUT, Analytic Psychology. 381 causation, and of the dynamics of consciousness, arouses the present writer's frequent dissent. On the other hand, Mr. Stout's analysis of the " noetic " states of consciousness, viewed just as an analysis of the structure and the significance of moment- ary and of serial conscious facts and processes, appears, as far as it goes, almost altogether admirable, except indeed in the analysis of Belief, with which I disagree. Moreover, the aspects of the knowing process upon which Mr. Stout lays stress have been far too much neglected. This makes their just recognition the more welcome. The significance of the more formal aspects of the conscious process, the importance, for knowledge, of the con- sciousness of mental wholes, or unities, the thesis that the con- sciousness of any such a mental whole does not depend upon a detailed consciousness of the parts, the allied thesis that the noetic process cannot be reduced to a mere series of mental images, the elaborate analysis of the processes whereby we become aware of the " meaning " of a train of thought all these are features of great importance in the chapters before us. Especially must the student of logic thank Mr. Stout for the light he has thrown upon the descriptive psychology of the thinking process. And in so far as Mr. Stout, in these analyses, opposes the traditional " association " doctrines of the constitution of the conscious stream, the present waiter rejoices in the confusion of the associa- tionists. But description is not causal explanation. A study of mental structure is not a dynamical theory. Psychical causation is not identical with psychical significance. And here, if I must speak for myself, begins my chief dissent from Mr. Stout's procedure. In the matter of the "dynamics" of consciousness, Mr. Stout takes sides with the partisans of "mental activity," while giving, to be sure, his own definitions of what constitutes mental activity and of what is the evidence for its existence. Here he necessarily comes upon especially controversial ground ground where the psychologist has to take account of general logical and metaphysi- cal theses as to the nature of causation, before he can make sure of his own right to assert the existence of causal connexions. Believing, as I myself do, that no introspective study of the con- tents, or of the sequences, or of the significance of conscious states, can determine the true nature of any causal link which binds them together, holding, as I do, that the conception of causation is one that logically forbids the verification of a causal connexion by any one observer of any series of facts, inner or outer, I am unable at present to accept the thesis that the psychologist can find in " mental activity," or in any aspect of the inner life, however significant, the warrant for a theory of the dynamics of consciousness. It is not then that I prize " associa- tion " more, but that I trust introspection in general less as to all dynamical questions of psychology. It is this fact which leads me to dissent from Mr. Stout's theories of psychical causation, while,