Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/362

 346 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART : Subject-Universal and the Predicate-Universal are in any sense identical. Our proposition only means that, wherever the Subject is found, the Predicate will be found also. This relation was not possible in the Singular Judgment, because the Subject there is a mere Individual, and therefore had no significance apart from the Universal, since, as we had pre- viously seen, its whole nature was made up of Universals. It had not enough independence to enter into any relation with the Universal which required it to be in any way dis- tinguished from the Universal. Its relation could only be simple identity if that can be called a relation and that w r as contradictory. Now, on the other hand, the Subject, denned by a Universal, has an independent meaning, and can enter into a different relation with the Predicate. We speak now, not of identity, but of the co-existence of Uni- versals. There is therefore no longer any difficulty in the fact that the two Universals have different connotations and denotations, and thus the Judgment of Allness has vindi- cated its right to be considered as a synthesis, since it has transcended the defects both of thesis and antithesis. The result gained may be stated from another point of view that it is impossible to suppose that the only connexion of the various Universals which are found in any Individual is its mere abstract Individuality, and that the Universals have no connexions among themselves. For the abstract Individuality, as distinct from the Universals, is a mere nonentity, incapable of bearing this, or any other, burden. If the Universals are found together and that we saw they must be there must be some ground of connexion between Universals themselves. In thus transcending Singular and Particular Judgments, we do not, of course, pronounce them to be false, but only inadequate. It may be quite true to say " This is red ". What we have gained in this triad is the knowledge that This (whatever it may be) could not be red, unless it belonged to some class of things, defined by some other Universal, of all of which redness might be predicated. We now leave the Individual for the present. Our Judg- ment has become a relation between Universals, and the rest of the Subjective Notion is occupied in developing this relation. A certain one-sidedness caused by this will be counterbalanced in the Objective notion and synthesised in the Idea.