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 TYPES OF WILL. 317 of another person becomes ours through sympathy, or through its harmony with our sentiments, does it become a motive to the will and an alternative to the desire we feel. But since the desire of another person often becomes such a motive in one way or the other, the imperative may be the result of a complex volition or choice. Thus you both desire to do what is best for your child, and you desire also through sympathy to yield to his desire. And where we choose between these motives, there seems first to be present to our minds the judgment that we are going to follow one of these two desires, and only afterwards, as it were a means to carrying this judgment into effect, does there issue from us an imperative or order to the child. Thus we are compelled to ask whether after all the imperative can be a volition, or only the means by which a preformed volition accomplishes its end. If we assume it to be only a means, we shall find it troublesome to point out in all cases the volition that pre- cedes it. In the case we have just considered, we deliberate between the child's desire and what, as responsible for him, we think he should be allowed to do. There is then that pause before the issue of our imperative in which we decide and are conscious of deciding between these alternatives. But the imperative often issues from us so suddenly that there is no sufficient interval in which the conscious judgment of how we are going to act can be formulated. A sudden want or desire rises in the mind, and we call upon a servant to fulfil it. The pull of the bell is an imperative, as much as our express order ; and, as so frequently in involuntary action, no doubt or question intervenes, still less a judgment which answers the question. There is a single desire cul- minating at once in an imperative; as in our simple cate- gorical volitions, a single desire culminates in a categorical judgment. But in the complex type of the imperative, where a voluntary choice ordinarily precedes its command and is defined in a judgment, does the imperative lapse from a volition and become something else? The volition may precede the imperative, but is not annulled. It is changed, but persists. It is first embodied in a judgment, afterwards in an imperative. In the same way a hypothetical volition often passes into a categorical. " If you are there I shall make a point of seeing you." " But I shall be there." ' Then I certainly will see you." In this volitional syl- logism, as it might be called, the hypothetical volition of the major premiss is transformed into the categorical