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 TYPES OF WILL. 313 tion we have had to surrender. We have seen hypothetical and disjunctive judgments which by their form are not to be distinguished from hypothetical and disjunctive volitions ; and in our present type we have merely discovered examples of categorical judgments which ape the character of cate- gorical volitions. There is indeed no reason why an involuntary tendency, any less than will, when it is at the point of accomplishing its end, should not become embodied in the same kind of judgment, making known to us the results which it is to bring about. We have to pass from the judgment to what it actually contains, before we can tell whether it embody an involuntary impulse or a volition. If we ask, in the next place, whether, in restrainibg a reflex tendency which has become a pressing desire, we are exhibiting choice, it does not follow because there are opposite desires present that there is any choice between them. As in the third type of fictitious choice, the decision between opposite desires was determined by a pre-existing volition, and the decision itself was no other than a judgment that decided which desire were stronger ; so here for another reason there may be no choice, if choice is a volition preceded by a genuine doubt as to the desire we are going to select. As in the types of involuntary action due to fear, we decide without hesitation, so here the escape of the reflex tendency may be so disgraceful, or fraught with such serious conse- quences, that we never doubt or ask ourselves whether we should permit it to escape ; we decide at once to restrain it. It may be objected that a moment before we decide to restrain the reflex tendency, there must be some doubt as to what we are going to decide ; but this objection would ex- emplify that frequent source of error in our science named by Prof. James " the psychologist's fallacy ". We, taking up the standpoint of an external observer, may judge that there is some uncertainty how the individual in question may act : he may experience no such uncertainty, but as soon as he recognises the conflicting tendencies, decide at once between them. When the order has been given by a military com- mander that, to surprise an enemy, the march must be noiseless, it may be difficult and painful for some individual to repress the tendency to cough, but the habit of military obedience does not admit of any doubt rising in his mind as to whether he should obey or satisfy a desire which is becoming imperious. He at once resists it, and if it escape, it escapes in spite of him. The volition is after all a simple volition ; and the disciplined soldier cannot be said to choose to obey his superior.