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 308 ALEXANDER F. SHAND : consider are partly produced by the strength of the idea which represents them. Now when an idea produces the action by its own strength and without any concurrent reso- lution on our part, that is called ideo-motor action : when an idea produces the action it represents not merely without our concurrence, but in spite of a contrary resolution, that we shall name involuntary ideo-motor action. Conflict is of the essence of this type ; we strive to restrain an idea of abnormal strength : we fail and our volition is abortive. But as complex volition is also characterised by conflict, we may perhaps find this type representative of real choice. The first sub-types we shall consider are those produced through fear. A man struggles not to become confused or dumfoundered through fear, and the idea of this result is that which produces it ; or he resolves that an anxious idea shall not interfere with some delicate operation he is con- ducting which requires calmness and self-control ; or that he will not attend to a horrible idea that is coming to fasci- nate him. And this impulse of fear, which, when not too intense, aids our escape from its object, here, through some morbid development or excessive intensity, defeats its in- stinctive end, and draws us to the very object we are striving to avoid. Ordinarily when we recognise within us the presence of such an overmastering fear, we at once concen- trate all the energies of our will in resisting it. We pass through no intervening state of doubt. We do not first ask ourselves, " Shall I oppose it or shall I yield ?" and decide after deliberation. Our action is immediate ; there is no " struggle so far as regards our own part in the matter V If then the precedence of such a struggle as this with doubt and question is essential to complex volition or choice, if choice is the mental state which arises when such a conflict ceases, then there is no choice. And there can be no real choice without a conflict of motives. But here there is only one motive present, the desire to restrain the action the idea of which persists. There is indeed another and contrary motive in a different sense. There is something present which is moving us to action, but it moves us to an involuntary not to a voluntary action. It is not a motive to the w r ill but against it. The conflict is then between a motive which the will immediately supports and an obstacle to that volition. And the doubt which so penetrates us at such times is not any doubt as to what we are going to will, but whether we can 1 Op. cit.