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 306 ALEXANDER F. SHAND : further question, then this question is witness to the pres- ence of a conation which will be embodied in the judgment which answers it, and will determine the action. This conation is probably blind at the outset a blind set of the will ; and it is never called in question or doubted. Only a speculative difficulty remains ; and fixing attention alter- nately on these two objects, it must let them play upon its feelings until some difference between their intensities is pro- duced ; and then, on the first recognition of a superiority on one side or the other, its impulsive conation rushes into will and self-consciousness in the judgment which signalises its discovery, " This is nicer : I will have this ". Now here we may suppose that both playthings appeal to the child's feel- ings, that alternately he feels desire for both. There is then, as in the last case, a conflict of desires ; and the will the conscious will is the outcome of this conflict, and does not as in the last case precede it. And these desires are motives since the will chooses between them. Does it not follow that this is a genuine and not a fictitious choice that the choice is a volition and not the mere selective judgment which fellows a disjunctive question? We must answer this question in the affirmative if we hold by our definition of will that it is not a blind but a foreseeing conation cul- minating in the judgment that the self is going to accomplish the event foreseen. And yet this result is not satisfactory. We shall be inclined to reverse it, to apply to all our four types the same treatment, and say : So far as there is any will in the process, it is at the commencement, not at the conclusion. All are types of fictitious choice; no one is real. For the mind is made up at the commencement, and no- thing occurs afterwards to alter the blind or conscious set of its will ; all that follows is the light thrown by the intellect upon the conflicting thoughts or desires, so that one of them is seen to represent the object of this pre-existerit will. And we are often disposed to take this broad view of the will. Those deep forces within us which work for the most part unseen, their tendencies unforeseen, whose objects only rise into clear thought at times, and at the moment of action are embodied in the judgment that we are going to fulfil them, seem to us the real and abiding will, and their con- scious expression an accident or momentary phase, the mere play of thought upon their upmost surfaces. We have come to distinguish two kinds of choice, fictitious and real ; but the former is real as far as judgment is con- cerned, fictitious only as far as will is concerned. The weak introspection and analysis of ordinary thought confuses