Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/320

 304 ALEXANDER F. SHAND : choice. Our answer must be that his volition does not appear for the first time in the conclusion. It has been present to his mind from the beginning and persists through- out. And the process of doubt, question and conflict is a means to its end, because it provokes the knowledge of which it stands in need. The will is not the outcome of this conflict, and is therefore not choice, but subordinates the conflict to the idea of its end. (2) We have assumed that the traveller knew at the outset that he would take the shortest route. A single dominant conation is implied in the question he asked, in the fact that he confined himself to this question. But he may not have been conscious of this conation : he may not have known that he would take the shortest route instead of the most beautiful. In that case the initial set of his mind is blind conation ; a set of the character, not a set of the will. Where then does the will appear, where is there a real choice? As in the last case, the doubt and question refer to the intellect. There is a conflict of thoughts, not a conflict of desires. And this intellectual process controlled by a blind conation culminates in the judgment that this route is shortest. But as soon as he reaches this conclusion, his blind conation is illumined by a consciousness of his end, and the man knows that he will take this route. Through knowledge, conation has developed into will, and we realise the truth of Mr. Stout's maxim that it is "the cognitive side of our character which gives determinate character to the cona- tive". 1 Still there is no choice, if choice means the selection be- tween conflicting conations or motives. It is a simple volition which coincides with a selection between ideas controlled by a single motive. It is the fictitious choice of judgment confused with the real choice of will because it is fused into one psychosis with a simple volition : " This route is shortest ; I will take it ". Here the first phrase expresses the selective judgment, the second the simple and driven will. There is this difference between our two types. In the first, a simple volition precedes and controls the process of doubt which culminates in fictitious choice. In the second it succeeds the process of doubt and conflict and coincides with the moment of fictitious choice. And there is this in common between them : in neither is there any conflict of desires or motives. 1 MiND, N.S., vol. v., p. 356.