Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/294

 278 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. (b) 4 e Annee, No. 6. Noveinbre, 1896. B. Gibson. ' La philosophie comme attitude.' [Self-determination is a fact fundamental in organic life ; and the philosophic attitude may at once be denominated an attitude of Self-determination. Attitudes wherein one is determined from without are radically non-philosophical. But in all cases the environ- ment the external medium also plays its part even in sei/'-determination. To explain this ' singular co-operation,' it is needful first to explain the meaning of ' organism '. This being done, the question arises : Can the interaction between me and the environing medium in its manifold forms be organic in its character ? The writer adopts the affirmative answer to this question. In a note he says that the discussion which follows was inspired by the course of lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow, during the winter session 1895-6, by Professor H. Jones.] E. lie Roy et G. Vincent. ' Sur 1'idee de nombre.' [A development and explanation of two articles, already (September and November, 1894) published in this Revue, on Mathematical Method.] E. HaleVy. ' Quel- ques remarques sur FirreVersibilite des phenomenes psychologiques.' [Mechanical phenomena are reversible. If the thesis of universal mechanism is true, if every physical is reducible to a mechanical problem, it follows from what has been said that the physical universe is rever- sible : " The planets might move retrogress! vely in their orbits without the violation of Newton's Law ". The negative of this seems dogmatically possible, only in virtue of the seeming irreversibility of the successive order of psychological phenomena. Psychological time seems to be distinguished from Physical or Mechanical time, in that the future cannot be converted into a past, nor the past into a future. Memory and foresight are not reducible to one another : they are the inverse, the one of the other. The psychological universe is thus apparently irreversible. The object of the following paper is to investigate the reasons why psychological phenomena present this appearance, and to determine whether it is only an appearance, and whether such phenomena are really reversible ; or, how far they are reversible, and how far they are not. Logical Thought, it concludes, involves irreversibility. The point of view of psychological, however, as of all, mechanism is incomplete, relative, and contradictory. The physical is, perhaps, ultimately reducible to the logical representation of the Universe.] Etudes critiques, etc. (among them, an important review of the Philosophy of Thomas HiU Green). REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE. No. 12. In an article entitled ' L'objet de la science sociale,' M. Halleux maintains that Sociology is neither a purely idealistic nor a purely empirical science, but stands midway between the two. It is, in truth, rather idealistic than empirical. It observes social facts, indeed, but it is in the investigation into the first origin of social facts and in the determination of their moral value that the formal object of Sociology is found. In view of the Anti-Semitic movements of the present day, M. Deploige thinks it may not be without interest to inquire into the attitude of St. Thomas Aquinas towards the Jews and their religion. In his article, ' Saint Thomas et la question Juive,' M. Deploige shows that according to the teaching of St. Thomas, (1) Jews are not to be forced to accept the Christian faith: "Judaei nullo modo sunt ad fidern compellendi ut ipsi credant, quia credere voluntatis est. . . . Voluntas cogi non potest ; " (2) Jewish children are not to be baptised without the consent of then- parents : " Nemini facienda est injuria ; fieret autem Judaeis injuria si eorum filii baptizarentur eis invitis ; " (3) the Jewish religion is not to be proscribed : " Ex hoc quod Judaei ritus suos observant, hi quibus