Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/268

 252 CRITICAL NOTICES: The Introduction discusses the Scope of Logic, Formal and Metaphysical Logic, The Nature of Cognition and the Divisions of Logic. The author begins by insisting that Logic is concerned not simply with the Laws of correct thinking, with Thought as it ought to be, but with thinking generally in reference to its inherent fitness for attaining the ends of knowledge and science, and the means which appertain to those ends. Thinking (Denken) is the same as judging (Urtheilen), namely, the mental activity to the products of which the epithets true and untrue are ap- plicable. But mere thinking is not Cognition. Cognition is thinking w T hich is true and is on right grounds, or, by reason of adequate evidence, believed to be true. It may be remarked here that the distinction between Thinking and Cognition, and the division of Judgments which we get on these lines do not seem, from the point of view of logical doctrine, to be theoretically elucidating or practically applicable. We might draw T the line between isolated judgments and judgments taken in connexion with others ; between those proved and those not proved or (perhaps) between those proved true and those proved untrue ; but if Cognition includes only judgments proved true, where are judgments proved untrue to be placed ? they seem to be neither Cognition nor mere thinking. And we cannot tell w r hether the Judgments of others are true and proved, in cases where we do not know the grounds on which they hold them. Again, we cannot apply the distinction to beliefs of our own which we accept on what seem to us sufficient grounds. Whether we divide " Judgments " into true and untrue, or reserve the appellation for those Predications which are true, we seem to reach the result that a Predication accepted by both A and B as true, may be true in A's case and untrue in B's. However, there is no doubt that what we ask concerning judg- ments, qua, mere isolated judgments, is not what they ought to be, but what they actually are. What is it that w y e do in judging ? is here the question ; and thus there seems good ground to accept the rectification of current definitions of Logic w T hich Dr. Berg- mann suggests. Logic, as he conceives it, is contrasted on the one hand with (1) Formal, on the other hand with what is called (2) Meta- physical, Logic. Kant is mentioned as the principal exponent of Formal Logic, Trendelenburg and Harms as writers who treat Logic as metaphysical ; and Ueberweg as a logician whose treat- ment has been much influenced by their view. Hegel's Logik is pronounced to be pure Metaphysics and not Logic at all in the traditional sense of that term. Bergmann gives (p. 17) his own view of the relation between Logic and Metaphysics as follows : " Logic is, in other words, the Science of the process of Knowledge, whilst Metaphysics has to do with the content of Knowledge. . . . Logic and Meta- physics are so far connected that each requires the help of the