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 230 BEENAED BOSANQUET : content between the present and the past and future. Passing over the shifting extension of the present, which goes to show that the difference between present and past is merely one of degree the problem would be quite different if the present were a segment of fixed length, cut off by infallible marks from the past we may point at once to the inevitable objection arising from the unity of knowledge, which Mr. Bradley referred to in the few words cited above. For we all know that in logic, i.e., in trying to catch the spirit of science and recognise its necessities, the first step is to transcend the distinctions of tense ; and this for the reason that they are incompatible with what we understand by universal truth ; and for science there is no truth except universal truth. And probably it is needless to labour this point. Scientific truth, it will be admitted, consists of universal connexions, such that if true at all they are always true, and if ever upset are wholly to be rejected. Observable sequence of events cannot be scientific truth. But I can imagine its being urged that the body of science, and of art or of religion, in so far 'as they aim at expressing eternal realities, are erections or constructions of the human mind, existent in fact within the present only, and valuable as focussing charac- teristics permanent throughout the entire world-process, itself extended in time. In view of such a position and it would be a gain, I think, per se, to know if such a position meets with support a line might be taken by idealists which would be less one of assault than of interpretation. A certain element of the world-process, supposed to be as a process the ultimate reality, would have been admitted to form a permanent background of the time-series. It would be a background ex hyp. not consisting in sensible objects or events and so far devoid of presentable existence. On the other hand, it would be of such a nature that the presentable existence could only by incorporation with it, and consequent loss of its present- able character, claim a truth (if the term reality is to be reserved for sensuous presentation) lasting beyond the instant of presentation. Now it is impossible for any modern students to say that a system of truths can be a mere psychical existence, without refer- ence to some character of a world beyond, though possibly one with, individual consciousness. This mode of escape is therefore shut off. And then what have we remaining ? We have reality as a sequence of presentable events, which sequence is endowed by the hypothesis with actual continuity of a certain kind. The nature of this continuity is permanent, and all universal truth con- sists in stating with more and more perfection the permanent nature or laws or characteristics of this continuity ; and no element of the succession can be embodied in a system of truth except in as far as it can be shown to be inherent in the per- manent nature of this continuity which we primarily notice as a succession. Would it not be true to say that we must choose at this point