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 HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION. 177 as a mere individual, and so not yet explicitly qualified by the Universal of being a rose. For this would be to beg the whole question of Judgment, i.e., how can an Individual be qualified by a Universal? Negative Judgment. How, we must now inquire, does this Positive Judgment break down, and compel us to continue the dialectic pro- cess ? Hegel says that all statements of the form I is U are necessarily false. If, for example, we point to a rose and say " This is red," there is a double falsity. Bed is not identical with the rose at which we point, for, in the first place, there are many other red things in the world besides this rose. And, in the second place, it is not identical with it, because the rose has many other qualities besides redness. Even if we have not identified it as a rose, but merely point to it, we shall know that it must have other qualities besides the red- ness, though we do not know what. An object could not exist with only one quality, for then it could in no way be distinguished from other objects which it in any way resembled. It seems at first sight as if this was a mere quibble. " Of course," it might be answered, " no one supposed that the is here was to be taken in the sense of absolute equivalence, as when we say the sum of three and two is five. A change of language will remove the difficulty. Say that the subject has redness, or the quality of being red, and the criticism ceases to have any force." But the defect is in reality too deeply rooted to be removed in this simple fashion. Some relation between the Individual and Universal must be found. Identity is obviously impossible. If the Universal was identical with the Individual, it could apply to no other Individuals but that one. That Individual would therefore not be connected by it with anything else, and therefore the Individual, since all connexion by Universals would be im- possible to it, would be absolutely isolated, with no resem- blance to anything else in the universe. Now, this state of isolation we have already seen to be impossible. Can we then say that the Individual has the Universal ? We have already used this method of relation in the Doctrine of Essence. There we were able to say that the Thing had its Properties. 1 But a difficulty has arisen since then. 1 Hegel has appropriated almost every possible word expressive of reality as the name of some category. Among these " Thing " designates 12