Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/192

 176 J. ELLIS MCTAGGAET : thing and each of its Universals. And this is what we do in Judgment. The question of how a thing and a Universal can be connected with one another, which was implicit in the Notion, becomes explicit in Judgment. This problem, to begin with, takes the form of starting from the thing, and endeavouring to adjust a Universal to it. This is called a Judgment of Inherence, as distin- guished from a Judgment of Subsumption, in which we start with the Universal and endeavour to connect the thing with it. 1 (From this point onwards the thing defined by. the Universal gets a special name, and is called the Individual.) That Judgment should commence as Judgment of Inherence is due to the form in which it receives the problem. Ever since the Thing first received some degree of definiteness, early in the Doctrine of Essence, the problem has been to define and explain it. And so we start here with the Indi- vidual as the datum, to which the Universal has to be related. The only relation we have had so far between the thing and its Universal has been an affirmative one, and so we start with a positive Judgment of Inherence I is U. The Particular has fallen out here, because, as we have seen, a Particular is only a Universal which has been sub- ordinated to another Universal. When, as in the Judgment of Inherence, we are considering only one Universal at a time, there can be no Particular. (Of course Universal and Particular Notions which may be terms in Judgments must be carefully distinguished from Universal and Par- ticular Judgments, which we shall find among Judgments of Subsumption.) In formal logic two other varieties of Judgment are pos- sible. I is I e.g., " Beaconsfield is Disraeli " ; and U is U e.g., " Man is mortal ". But the first of these would be no help to us here, since it would not help us to develop the nature of the Individual, and the second we have as yet no right to use, until we have established the validity of general propositions. The I here must be taken strictly as a mere Individual, not as yet qualified by a Universal. We must not say, for example, " This rose is red," but simply " This is red ". We may, indeed, say " this rose," as Hegel does, to avoid the ambiguities which arise from the use of the simple demon- strative in writing, but we must consider the subject indicated 1 The names which Hegel gives to these two divisions are Qualitative Judgment and Judgment of Reflexion. I have ventured to change them for the more significant titles which he suggests in the Greater Logic (W&rke, v., p. 94).