Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/186

 170 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART : We removed the idea of constraint, when we reached the category of Reciprocity, by removing the idea of an inner nature as distinct from external relations. But, by the time that we have reached the category of End, the idea of an inner nature has come back again, though in a different and higher form. It is not now conceived, as it was in Essence, as something existing side by side with the external relations, connected with them, but distinct from them. It now takes the form of a Purpose or Ideal, which we conceive should be or ought to be realised by means of the external relations. It is clear that the possibility of conflict and constraint has returned here, though in a different form. It is not now, as before, a conflict between two existent factors or elements of the thing's existence. It is now a conflict between that which is and that which ought to be, but is not. When such a conflict exists, we call the thing con- strained. When the real and the ideal harmonise, we call it free. This reaches its most striking form when we come to a self-conscious individual, who is conscious (in a more or less adequate form) of his ideal, and who pronounces himself free or constrained in proportion as he has or has not realised it. He is thus able to pass judgments of moral condemnation on that very system of complete determination of which his judgments of condemnation are themselves a part. This conflict will require a deeper reconciliation than the one which proved effectual in Reciprocity. It cannot be brought about, as before, by reducing the inner nature to another name for the outside circumstances. For, although a separate inner nature, as Essence, was a delusion, a separate inner nature, as Ideal, is a reality. And, therefore, the reconciliation will have to be reached, not by eliminating the inner nature, but by demonstrating it to be in harmony with the external relations. The freedom which is attained by the establishment of complete necessity is thus only negative and imperfect freedom, but it is all that can be obtained at the point of the dialectic where it is introduced, and it is also all that is required, since it removes all the constraint which can be conceived as existing before the introduction of the idea of End. We must return from this digression to the question how we are to proceed from Reciprocity now recognised as Freedom to the Universal Notion as Such. The Universal Notion as Such is clearly, w r hatever else it is, a common quality to be found in two or more things, which are united