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 168 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART : such that it makes especial use of these categories, which are therefore named from the subject-matter on which they are most often employed. Analogies to this may be found in the Objective Notion. Two of the divisions are here named Mechanism and Chemism. It is clear, however, that these categories are not meant to apply solely in the ordinary sciences of Mechanics and Chemistry. They are ideas applicable to all reality, but the most striking instances of their use can be found in those sciences, from which, therefore, they take their names. It must be admitted that this principle of nomenclature is not only perplexing to the reader, but in some cases mislead- ing to the author. In dealing with the categories of Judg- ment and Syllogism, Hegel seems at several points to be led into unnecessary complexity by the desire of carrying the analogy with formal logic as far as possible. But to this question we shall return. We can now understand, too, why the whole section is called Subjective. It is called Subjective because it is con- tingent, and its contingency is the same which we find in formal logic that the principle of classifying which is adopted is entirely indifferent. For formal logic all uni- versals are of the same importance, and it sees no difference between a classification which, e.g., classes pictures by their painters, and one which classes them by the size of their frames. From this contingency we do not begin to escape till we reach the Syllogism of Necessity. THE NOTION AS SUCH. THE UNIVERSAL NOTION AS SUCH. The last point which Hegel reaches, before the Subjective Notion, is, as I have said, the category of Reciprocity. For the purpose of this paper we must assume the validity of Reciprocity, and we have now to consider the transition from this to the first stage of the Subjective Notion. This is the Notion as Such, which appears first in the form of the Universal Notion. With regard to this transition we must notice, in the first place, that we have here attained to the idea of completely necessary determination. In Causality, while the effect is determined, the cause is free, and, however far we may push back the chain of causation, the last link to which we have at any moment attained will be a cause only, and not an