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 166 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART : ness than can be found in any other part of the Logic. It is, in the first place, divided into three stages, entitled by Hegel the Notion as Such, the Judgment, and the Syllogism. The Notion as Such is subdivided into the Universal, the Particular, and the Individual. The Judgment has four sub- divisions Judgment of Existence, of Keflexion, of Neces- sity, and of the Notion. Syllogism, again, is subdivided into Syllogisms of Existence, of Reflexion, and of Necessity. Each of the subdivisions of Judgment and Syllogism is again divided into three yet more minute stages. One or two of these divisions I shall venture to suggest ought to be dis- carded as superfluous or worse, but even then this part of the dialectic will remain exceptionally elaborate. What is the significance of these names ? They seem at first sight to mean that this part of the dialectic deals only with the workings of our minds, and not with all reality. This might account, it would appear, for its being called Sub- jective, and for the choice of such names as Judgment and Syllogism for its divisions. But such a use of Subjective would not be Hegelian. For him Subjective does not mean the inner as opposed to the outer. It means rather the particular, contingent, and capricious, as opposed to the universal, necessary, and reasonable. 1 And thus our hypothesis would fail to explain the choice of Subjective as the title of the division. Moreover, our hypothesis is untenable. For on examining the categories which have the titles of Notion as Such, Judgment and Syllogism, it becomes evident that, in spite of their names, they do not apply only to the states of our mind, but to all reality. They grow, by the dialectic pro- cess, out of the categories of Essence, and the categories of the Objective Notion, in turn, grow out of them. There is no doubt that the categories of Essence and of the Objective Notion refer to all reality, and so, therefore, must the cate- gories of the Subjective Notion. Otherwise they could never solve the contradictions which arise in Essence, nor, from their contradictions, could we be entitled to proceed to the Objective Notion. Hegel's own language, too, renders it clear that these categories are meant to apply to all reality. He says, for 1 The only case, so far as I know, in which Hegel uses Subjective in any other way, is in the Greater Logic, when he calls the doctrines of Being and Essence by the name of Objective, and the doctrine of the Notion by the name of Subjective. But this is not repeated in the Smaller Logic, and he says that he considers this use of the names as unsatisfactory, though usual. Cf. Werke, iii., p. 51.