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 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 139 Tannery. ' Sur la periode finale de la philosophic grecque.' [Emphasises the importance of the early Aristotelian commentators.] EEVUE DE ME"TAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. 4 e Aiuiee, No. 4. Juillet, 1896. Numero specialement consacre a Descartes. Consists of ' Essays on the Method, Metaphysics, Moral Doctrine, and Physics,' etc., of Descartes. B. Gibson. ' La geometric de Descartes au point de vue de sa methode.' [Exhibits the relationship of the ' Begulse ' to the Geometric, and explains the application of the ' Method ' to Geometry.] J. Berthet. ' La Methode de Descartes avant la Discours.' [The ' enumeration ' inculcated in the ' method ; is not inductive, but strictly deductive. " M. Liard has rightly observed that Descartes' discovery con- sists less in the explanation of geometry by algebra, than in the explana- tion ot algebra by geometry." Notices that Descartes had discovered his Method and his science before essaying ontological speculation : only later on he connected physics with God's existence, etc.] P. Natorp. ' Le developpement de la pensee de Descartes depuis les " Begulae " jusqn'aux Meditations.' [All Descartes' idealism proper is contained in the ' Method '. Afterwards, in his metaphysics, he becomes only a demi- idealist, reaching his gravest deviation from critical idealism when he makes the truth of intelligence rest on the ' Divine veracity '.] A. Hannequin. ' La Preuve ontologique Carte'sienne defendue centre Leib- niz.' [Leibniz charged Descartes with neglecting to show the ' possi- bility ' of " the supremely perfect Being," thus rendering the proof of his existence null and void. Leibniz also charged Descartes with errone- ously regarding existence as a perfection. Against these charges Hanne- quin defends Descartes.] H. Schwarz. ' Les Eecherches de Descartes sur la connaissance du monde exteVieur.' [The problem of the origin of the belief in the external world is psychological ; that of its veracity is meta- physical. The differentiation of the former problem from the latter was completed by the speculations of Descartes, who, however, did not succeed in freeing himself from the psychology of the schools as he had freed himself from their metaphysics.] We can do no more than mention some of the essays which follow in this splendid Number of the Revue. P. Tannery. ' Descartes physicien.' E. Boutroux. ' Du rapport de la morale a la science dans la philosophic de Descartes.' V. Brochard. ' Le traite des Passions de Descartes et 1'fithique de Spinoza.' An article by Ch. Adam of great value to the student of Descartes concludes the Number, containing a list of all the philosopher's extant autographs, etc., with an account of the places in which they are now preserved. EEVUE NE"O-SCOLASTIQUK. No. 11. D. Mercier resumes the criticism of the psychological system of Descartes, which he had commenced in the preceding Number. He now maintains that the fundamental defect of Descartes' system lay in this, that instead of regarding man as a single composite substance resulting from the substantial union of body and soul, Descartes regarded man as composed of two distinct substances, complete in themselves, the thinking soul and the extended body. In the succeeding Number of the Revue, M. Mercier will bring his study of Descartes' psychology to a conclusion. P Mansion, returning to his examination of the ' Principes de Me'tageornetrie ou de Geometrie Generale,' explains the nature of postulates v. and vi., proves the indemonstrable character of the postulates of Metageometry, and, comparing together Metageometry and Kantism, points out that Metageometry is radically opposed to the conception of space as a necessary a priori representation, and, by demonstrating the futility of what Lechalas has called Kant's ' Geometrical Imperative,' de- stroys one of the foundations of the Kritik dcr reinen Vernunft. In his treatise, ' De anima,' Aristotle discusses questions which are,