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 NEW BOOKS. 127 La Theorie Platonicienne des sciences. Par ELIE HALEVY. Paris : Felix Alcan, 1896. London : Williams & Norgate. Pp. xl., 378. The object of this book, as defined by the author, is " en etudiant la theorie platonicienne des sciences, tenter un essai de solution des contradictions platoniciennes ". M. Halevy holds that Plato's apparent inconsistencies flow from the antithesis which we find in his writings between Critical and Constructive Dialectic, and that this antithesis is itself apparent rather than real. He endeavours to establish his theory by a systematic interpretation of the dialogues, in the course of which many of the difficulties in Plato's metaphysical doctrine are discussed, and a tolerably complete system of philosophy is expounded. The author will not allow that the critical or negative dialogues are necessarily earlier than the constructive. On the contrary, his ex- position of critical, or, as he calls it, regressive dialectic, draws more largely from dialogues, which are now generally regarded as late, such as the Sophist, Thesetetus, and Philebus, than from the so-called Socratic dialogues. This is in harmony with his general conception of Plato's purpose, which is that Plato used regressive dialectic to sift notions, to disabuse the mind of the false persuasion of knowledge, and to lead the pupil up to the height from which he might begin to see the reality of things by the aid of progressive dialectic. Thus far, M. Halevy's distinction is like the intellectual ascent and descent of book vi. of the Republic. The work itself, exclusive of the Introduction, falls into two divisions, concerned respectively with the two kinds of Dialectic. The results of the Regressive variety are shown so far as concerns Body and Soul, the State and the Individual, Practice and Theory, and the Problem of Parti- cipation. It need hardly be said that many of the author's statements are open to question ; for nothing can be predicated about Plato which will not arouse opposition. M. Halevy's general attitude may be gathered from his treatment of the relation between Soul and Body. " Le corps n'est qu'une fa9on de parler de 1'ame." It may perhaps be doubted whether much is to be gained for the elucidation of Plato by using in so difficult matter a " fa^on de parler," which Plato did not himself see fit to employ. But if it is the framing of a philosophical system at which we are aiming, and not simply the explanation of Plato, such a procedure is legitimate enough, and the readiness with which it commands approval is an extraordinary proof of the flexibility of Plato's genius. " Hie liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque, Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua." But to return. As the Body, so far as it exists, exists for the sake of the Soul, so, in a certain sense, the State exists for the Individual : " la science de la repression penale n'est que par et pour la science de 1'enseignement ". Here, as it seems to the present reviewer, M. Halevy stands on surer ground, and also when he argues that Philosophic Education aims at implanting scientific virtue in contrast to social or psychological virtue, as depicted in books ii. to iv. of the Republic. The discussion of the problem of participa- tion centres chiefly on the Parmenides, which is " a la fois le dernier terme de la dialectique regressive et la preparation de ce second moment de la philosophie platonicienne, oil la dialectique systematise et construit". This part of M. Halevy's treatise appears to us particularly thorough and well thought out ; but whether it will carry conviction to Platonic students, is another question. The second part of the work before us takes as its point of departure vur)(rts or <pp6vrj(Tis " qui consiste dans 1'accord interne, o/xoi/otn, et dans