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 FB. PAULHAN, Esprits Logiques et Espmts Faux. 97 Yet after considering in the first two chapters how thought grows into a system relatively independent of desires and tendencies, in the third chapter the author seems to recognise that expressed in this way the problem is insoluble. He remarks that when we create this opposition between the intellect and the sentiments we do not always notice that the intellect becomes " the object of an eager passion," and that " the intellectual desires are altogether comparable to the desires of feeling (cttsirs affectifs) ". l And this emphasises the criticism which I have ventured to make that the real question we have to ask is how this new intellectual passion with its attendant desires is developed, not the meaningless ques- tion how the intellect comes to separate itself from desires and tendencies. For after this sentiment or passion is formed, what- ever other sentiments and desires still subsist in a man do not the less require the mediation of thought to attain their ends, and even for their very constitution. Desire with the thought abstracted from it would not be desire, but a blind impulse ; sentiment would not be the love of anything without a thought of the thing. But when the new sentiment is formed, thought, while remaining as subservient to other sentiments and desires as before, also and in addition is systematised within this new sentiment. Here it is not subservient to the wants of the organism and to practical interests ; it is an end in itself. The reflective love of thought for itself is not indeed felt for its states of doubt and ignorance, but for their in- herent tendency to develop into knowledge. It is the love of thought for true thought's sake. But how this reflective senti- ment is developed the author does not inform us, though he expends much ingenuity in explaining how thought becomes de- tached from its original tendencies. Is there any difficulty about this double attitude of thought ? Do we suppose that when it enters the new sentiment it must, like an object that changes its places, leave the others vacant ? Obviously we are not concerned with the numerical identity of thought but with its qualitative identity. The same thought in this sense may belong to different systems, and attach to different sentiments, and while in most it is subordinated to their practical ends, in some one it becomes pure and disinterested. And as the intellectual life develops this one sentiment tends to become the dominant one, and to subordinate others to its overmastering end; so that the thought which they dispense is no longer merely subor- dinate to their ends, but, like these ends themselves, is regulated by the supreme sentiment. In the ideal development of this type, which, as M. Paulhan remarks, like all pure types is non- existent, the entire thought of the mind is subordinated only to the end of advancement in knowledge. But how is it that in a system of thought the ideas which it employs do not excite the desires with which they were formerly connected ? 2 The thought of food does not excite hunger when 1 Esprits Logiques, p. 79. 2 P. 47. 7